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Abstract
Can consumption taxes reduce inequality in developing countries? We combine
household expenditure data from 31 countries with theory to shed new light on the
redistributive potential and optimal design of consumption taxes. We use the type of
store in which purchases occur to proxy for informal (untaxed) consumption. This
enables us to characterize the informality Engel curve: we find that the budget share
spent in the informal sector steeply declines with income, in all countries. The in-
formal sector thus makes consumption taxes progressive: households in the richest
quintile face an effective tax rate that is twice that of the poorest quintile. We ex-
tend the standard optimal commodity tax model to allow for informal consumption
and calibrate it to the data to study the effects of different tax policies on inequality.
Contrary to consensus, we show that consumption taxes are redistributive, lower-
ing inequality by as much as personal income taxes. Once informality is taken into
account, commonly used redistributive policies, such as reduced tax rates on neces-
sities, have a limited impact on inequality. In particular, subsidizing food cannot be
justified on equity or efficiency grounds in several poor countries.
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1 Introduction
Inequality in developing countries is higher than in most rich countries and has re-
mained high over the past 30 years (Alvaredo and Gasparini, 2015). To what extent can
tax systems redistribute income in these countries? In this paper, we combine micro-
data and theory to shed new light on the redistributive potential and optimal design
of consumption taxes, the main source of government revenue in developing countries.
We find that consumption taxes are redistributive, lowering inequality by as much as in-
come taxes. These effects are primarily due to different informal (untaxed) consumption
patterns along the household income distribution. We also show that, once informal con-
sumption is accounted for, commonly used redistributive policies such as reduced rates
on necessity goods hardly reduce inequality. Our results stand in contrast to the exist-
ing literature, which does not take into account the existence of informal consumption,
and concludes that consumption taxes have a limited or negative redistributive effect in
developing countries (see for example Lustig, 2018).
A major constraint in studying informality is that, by definition, informal sector pur-
chases are hard to observe and to link to consumers’ incomes. We innovate by us-
ing the types of stores in which households report purchasing items – ranging from
home production to street vendors to supermarkets – to proxy for consumption from
the informal sector. We create a new micro-database of expenditure surveys from 31
low-and middle-income countries which contains information on the store type at the
transaction-level. The store-type classification is harmonized across countries and con-
sistent with the macro-development taxonomy of traditional versus modern retailers
(Lagakos, 2016). We assign each store type to the formal or informal sector, building on
micro evidence from retail censuses and on the literature showing that large, modern
retailers are much more likely to remit taxes than smaller, traditional retailers (Kleven
et al., 2016). This consumption-based measure of the informal sector complements pre-
existing approaches which focus on informality at the firm and/or worker level.1
Our paper makes three contributions. First, we produce new stylized facts on con-
sumption patterns across the income distribution and over development. We document
the existence of downward-sloping Informality Engel Curves (IECs): within each coun-
try, the informal budget share declines steeply with household income. The IECs have a
stable, log-linear functional form in all countries and their slopes remain negative even
after controlling for household location and narrow categories of goods. We provide sug-
1Our measure is related to the literature in public finance which uses consumption data to infer evasion
behavior (see Pissarides and Weber, 1989; Feldman and Slemrod, 2007; Morrow et al., 2019)
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gestive evidence that the residual slopes may be explained by richer households valuing
quality more and formal firms selling higher-quality products.2 The shape of the IECs
implies that the de facto exemption of the informal sector from taxes makes consump-
tion taxes progressive (the taxed budget share increase with income). We find that with a
simple uniform rate on all goods, the richest quintile pays twice as much in taxes as the
poorest quintile in the average country. This ’progressivity dividend’ from exempting
the informal sector is largest in the poorest countries and decreases with development.
We similarly characterize food Engel curves and confirm that they are downward
sloping in all countries, consistent with an extensive literature (for example Deaton and
Paxson, 1998). This shape motivates the frequent use of de jure exemptions of food from
consumption taxes. We find that food exemption makes consumption taxes progressive,
but less so on average than the de facto exemption of the informal sector. The progres-
sivity impact of exempting food is nil in the poorest countries, where poorer households’
food consumption is almost exclusively informal, and increases with development.
Our second contribution is a simple model that derives the implications of these
consumption patterns for tax policy. We extend the multi-person model of optimal com-
modity taxation of Diamond (1975) in two directions: we introduce formal and informal
(untaxed) varieties of each good and we allow for changes in consumption patterns over
the development path. Allowing for informal varieties increases the efficiency cost of
consumption taxes, because households can substitute to informal varieties when these
taxes increase. It increases their equity benefits, by making consumption taxes progres-
sive as long as IECs are downward sloping. Calibrating the model to the data, we find
that the optimal level of rate differentiation between food and non-food products in-
creases with development.3 This is due to the shape of the formal food Engel curve,
which is flat in low-income countries but negative in middle-income countries. In some
poorest countries, we find that subsidizing food relative to non-food cannot be justified
on equity or on efficiency grounds.
Our third contribution is to investigate the impact of consumption tax policies on
inequality by combining the calibrated optimal rates with the household data.4 We find
that setting a uniform tax rate on all goods while taking into account the de facto exemp-
tion of the informal sector achieves on average as much inequality reduction as existing
2This is in line with evidence in Faber and Fally (2017) and Atkin et al. (2018b).
3This is true for our baseline value of the elasticity of substitution in consumption between formal and
informal varieties, the parameter which determines the size of the efficiency cost of taxation due to the
existence of an informal sector. We use a baseline value taken from empirical estimates in the literature
and discuss the robustness of our results to alternative values.
4The impact of a tax policy on inequality depends not only on its progressivity, but also on the level
of tax rates and size of tax bases which determine the share of taxes in households’ budgets.
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direct tax policies (income taxes and social security) in developing countries. Moreover,
this policy achieves 75% of the inequality reduction obtained in a counterfactual world
with perfect enforcement in which governments can tax both formal and informal vari-
eties (thereby taxing a much larger base) and optimally differentiate rates between food
and non-food goods. Finally, in the realistic world in which informal varieties cannot be
taxed, the de facto exemption of the informal sector achieves twice as much inequality
reduction as the de jure optimal rate differentiation.
The results are robust to changing our main assumptions. First, we obtain similar
results when changing the formality assignment for places of purchases for which there
is uncertainty.5 Second, we assume at baseline a zero pass-through of taxes to prices in
informal stores. We use data on the universe of formal and informal retailers in Mexico
to relax this assumption, and find that doing so only slightly reduces the redistributive
effect of informality. Third, our baseline results use total household expenditure to proxy
for household income.6 We obtain similar results using income distributions constructed
with estimates of distributional saving rates. Finally, we discuss the implications of our
modeling assumption that no direct tax instrument is available to the government.
Our findings have several main implications. First, the result that consumption taxes
reduce inequality in developing countries runs counter to the consensus view in the pol-
icy and academic literatures, which argue that these taxes have little or no redistributive
potential (Sah 1983; Shah and Whalley 1991; Gemmell and Morrissey 2005; Coady 2006).
These previous studies do not account for differences in informal consumption along the
household income distribution, which our results show have large, positive impacts on
redistribution. This negative prior may explain why studies of redistribution in devel-
oping countries often focus on the design of government transfers (Tanzi 1998; Clements
et al. 2015). Our findings suggest more attention should be paid to the redistributive
potential of tax design in these countries. Second, we obtain our results by measuring
informality at the consumer level, while most studies focus on informality at the firm
and/or worker level (DeSoto 1989; De Paula and Scheinkman 2010; Gerard and Gonzaga
2016; Ulyssea 2018). This approach leads to a more nuanced perspective on the welfare
effects of the informal sector, which is often thought to trap the poor in low-productivity
firms (La Porta and Shleifer 2014; Hsieh and Klenow 2014). In particular, our findings
caution that while enforcement policies to reduce informality may yield production effi-
ciency gains (Ulyssea, 2020), they might also have distributional costs by increasing the
5This is because the association between budget shares and household income is strongest for places
of purchase which are clearly informal (non-market consumption) or clearly formal (large supermarkets).
6This is due to data limitations. Expenditure surveys in developing countries often do not attempt to
directly measure income because of serious measurement issues - see Deaton (1997) for a discussion.
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tax burden on poorer households. Third, by combining micro survey data from countries
spanning a wide range of economic development (from Burundi to Chile), we document
new stylized facts on consumption patterns across ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ retailers as
households get richer within and across countries. Our database could be used to test
competing theories of development and global retail (Bronnenberg and Ellickson, 2015).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the following sub-section, we sum-
marize our contributions relative to existing literatures. Section 2 describes our data
sources and methodology. Section 3 provides new stylized facts on consumption pat-
terns across places of purchase and types of goods as households get richer within and
between countries. Section 4 investigates the implications of these consumption patterns
for tax progressivity. Section 5 develops a model to characterize optimal commodity tax
policy with informal consumption. Section 6 calibrates the model using our data and
investigates the impacts of consumption taxes on inequality. Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper makes three main contributions to the literatures on tax policy and consump-
tion in developing countries. First, we introduce differences in informal consumption
along the income distribution as a novel channel through which consumption taxes are
redistributive. This contrasts with the existing literature, which omits informal con-
sumption and concludes that consumption taxes have, at best, limited redistributive
impacts in developing countries (for recent studies, see Harris et al., 2018 and Lustig,
2018).7 Our approach is thus related to recent papers on the redistributive implications
of differences in consumption patterns across the income distribution, which focus on
developed countries (Faber and Fally, 2017; Jaravel, 2018; Allcott et al., 2019).
Second, we contribute to the literature on the design of consumption taxes under lim-
ited enforcement capacity (Pomeranz, 2015; Naritomi, 2019; Waseem, 2020).8 We revisit
the redistributive potential of differentiating consumption tax rates across goods. Such
policies are commonly implemented (Ebrill et al., 2001), but papers that study the re-
distribution achieved by optimal rate differentiation only do so on a country-by-country
basis.9 We combine theory and novel data to undertake the first systematic analysis
7Two exceptions are Mun˜oz and Cho (2003) and Jenkins et al. (2006) who use retailer information to
classify expenditures as formal or informal, respectively in the Dominican Republic and in Ethiopia.
8More generally, we contribute to the growing literature on taxation under weak enforcement (Almu-
nia et al., 2019; Basri et al., 2019; Brockmeyer and Hernandez, 2019; Weigel, 2019; London˜o-Velez, 2020).
9Including: In the United Kingdom, Sah (1983); in India, Ahmad and Stern (1984), Ray (1986), Srini-
vasan (1989); in Australia, Creedy (2001).
4
of optimal rate differentiation across goods and its impact on inequality across a large
sample of low and middle-income countries.10 More generally, we build on the litera-
ture on optimal tax design under imperfect enforcement which typically concentrates on
the efficiency costs of taxation (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Cremer and Gahvari, 1993;
Boadway and Sato, 2009); we consider instead both the equity and efficiency implications
of informal consumption patterns.11.
Finally, this paper speaks to the literature on consumption patterns and develop-
ment. A large body of work documents how budget shares spent on specific goods
vary with income, including the well-established food Engel curve (Deaton and Paxson,
1998; Anker et al., 2011; Pritchett and Spivack, 2013; Alma˚s, 2012). We document, in
addition, the association between household income and place of purchase both within
and across countries. Thus, our analysis complements recent studies that document ag-
gregate changes in the retail sector over development (Bronnenberg and Ellickson, 2015;
Lagakos, 2016; Atkin et al., 2018b).12
2 Data and Measurement of Informal Consumption
We use two data sets to present new evidence on consumption patterns in developing
countries and on the redistributive potential of consumption taxes. Our core sample
consists of 31 countries for which the data enable us to proxy for informal consumption
at the household level. Our extended sample consists of 80 countries for which the data
allow us to document food consumption patterns.
2.1 Core Sample
We assemble our core dataset by combining household expenditure surveys from 31
countries that satisfy three selection criteria. First, the survey must be nationally repre-
sentative. Second, the survey must record consumption from open diaries rather than
pre-filled diaries, which only contain information on selected products. This helps to
ensure that the survey covers all expenditures. Third, the diary must ask households to
report the store type that each expenditure is purchased from - the place of purchase - and
this information must be systematically reported in the diaries. This last criterion en-
sures that we can apply our method to robustly measure informal sector consumption,
10Our main results focus on food versus non-food rate differentiation, but we also show results for
optimal differentiation between 12 large goods categories.
11See Kopczuk (2001) for an exception
12Our approach is related to a recent literature which compiles multi-country microdata to study macro
changes over the development path (Bick et al., 2018; Donovan et al., 2018).
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as described below.
Our core sample from 31 countries contains information on over 400,000 households.
Table 1 lists alphabetically the countries in the core sample, with their survey name
and year, the number of households, and the average number of purchases reported
per household. Countries in the sample are principally located in Latin America and
Sub-Saharan Africa. Unfortunately, most household expenditure surveys in Asia do not
contain information on the place of purchase13 Nonetheless, the core sample covers a
wide range of development levels, from Burundi (GDP pc of 250 USD) to Chile (15,000
USD). In Section 3.3, we show that this core sample is very comparable to the large set
of developing countries in the extended sample, along detailed expenditure dimensions
that can be observed in samples.
Appendix B provides further details on the data sources used. Table B1 shows the
geographical coverage of the core sample, table B2 lists the surveys considered for in-
clusion but ultimately discarded due to selection criteria, and table B3 provides further
details on the structure of the surveys for each country in the core sample.14
2.2 Method: Proxy for Informal Consumption Using Places of Purchase
Our main methodological innovation is to use the place of purchase reported for each
expenditure to assign a probability that it was obtained from a formal (tax remitting)
source. Most recorded expenditures can be classified by place of purchase into seven
categories. The first five pertain to purchases of goods. Ranked by ascending order of
retailer size, these are: (1) non-market consumption (e.g. home production); (2) non
brick-and-mortar stores (e.g. street stalls, public markets); (3) corner and convenience
stores; (4) specialized stores (e.g. clothing stores); and, (5) large stores (e.g. supermar-
kets, department stores). Purchases of services can be allocated to two main categories:
(6) services provided by an institution (e.g. banks, hospitals); and, (7) services provided
by an individual (e.g. domestic services).15 Combined, these categories account for 86%
of total household expenditure. The remaining 14% are items for which no place of
purchase is specified, primarily utilities, fuel and telecommunication (see Figure A3).16
13Survey design appears correlated across countries within regions, showing the influence of regional
development partners and historical ties. Our data contain one Asia/Pacific country - Papua New Guinea
14Replication codes for the paper can be accessed here. This includes the cleaning files of each expen-
diture survey and the files generating the tables and figures of the paper. The data are not provided as
we had to require access to the World Bank or Stat Agency for each country. Yet, these data are often
accessible, allowing for a replication of the paper on a subset of countries of interest.
15We also use two smaller categories to classify entertainment services into (8) entertainment (e.g.
restaurants) and (9) informal entertainment (e.g. food trucks).
16We exclude housing expenditure due to limited data on owner-occupied imputed rents.
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We assign each category to either the formal or informal sector. We define a category
as belonging to the formal sector if it is likely that consumption taxes are remitted on
most purchases from that category. According to this definition, many retailers are
informal because they evade taxes due on their sales. Alternatively, small retailers may
be informal because they are not required to register for consumption taxes due to their
size. We do not distinguish between these channels, as both imply that these retailers
do not remit consumption taxes. In addition, these concepts are closely related: in
countries with low enforcement capacity, the scope for evasion among small firms is
such that the net revenue from bringing them into the tax net is small and outweighed
by administrative and compliance costs (Ebrill et al., 2001; Keen and Mintz, 2004).
The key assumption behind our assignment method is that larger retailers are more
likely to be formal. This is in part mechanically true, as a frequently used criteria for
compulsory tax registration is firm size. In addition, a large literature argues that larger
firms are less likely to evade taxes. Theoretically, Kleven et al. (2016) develop a model of
tax evasion in which informality must be sustained by collusion between firm managers
and their employees, and show that larger firms are more compliant since collusion costs
increase with firm size. Hsieh and Olken (2014) similarly argue that the effective burden
of taxation in developing countries falls more heavily on larger firms. Empirically, Kum-
ler et al. (2015) find that compliance indeed increases with firm size in Mexico. Naritomi
(2019) provides evidence suggesting that larger retail stores have more customers and
are therefore less able to sustain evasion. Both Bronnenberg and Ellickson (2015) and
Lagakos (2016) categorize retailers as either ‘traditional’ (small, labor intensive retailers
- our categories 1 to 3) or modern (large, capital intensive retailers - our categories 4 and
5), and argue that traditional retailers are mostly informal.17
We provide direct evidence that formality and firm size are positively correlated. We
use data on formality status and firm size available in the retail firm censuses of four
countries in our core sample (Cameroon, Mexico, Peru and Rwanda). Panel A in Figure 1
shows the share of formal firms as a function of log employment in each country.18 In all
countries, retailers with a few employees are overwhelmingly informal, but more than
80% of retailers with 20 or more employees are formal. In Mexico, the census classifies
retailers in categories which are similar to our broad place of purchase categories. This
enables us to go one step further and directly observe retailer size and formality status.
17Relatedly, Gordon and Li (2009) explain the high shares of taxes on capital (such as corporate income
taxes) in developing countries relative to rich countries by the fact that capital is more observable than
labor in these countries. This also implies higher compliance rates among larger retailers.
18Formality is defined as ’being registered with tax authority’ in Cameroon and Rwanda, and ’paying
value-added-taxes on sales’ in Mexico and Peru.
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Figure 1 shows for our categories (1) to (5) the log median number of employees (Panel
A) and the share of firms paying value-added taxes on their sales (Panel C). We observe
that non-brick-and-mortar stores and convenience stores are small and rarely formal,
whereas nearly all large stores are formal.
Given this evidence, our baseline formality assignment assigns categories (1) to (3)
to the informal sector, and categories (4) and (5) to the formal sector. Goods in category
(1) - non-market consumption - are by definition not purchased in markets and are
therefore untaxed. Categories (2) and (3) (non brick and mortar stores and corner stores)
are likely very small and mostly informal, whereas category (5) (large stores) consists
mostly of supermarkets which are unlikely to be non-compliant. Our approach assigns
retailer-types to informality which are all classified as ’traditional’ tax-evading retailers
in Lagakos (2016).
For services, we assume that institutions pay taxes while individual providers do not.
This leads us to assign category (6) to the formal sector and category (7) to the informal
sector. We follow the same logic in assigning expenditures in the unspecified category to
the formal sector: the bulk of these expenditures are utilities typically provided by large
institutions which cannot evade taxes (Figure A3). Appendix B provides more details on
the methodology. Table B4 shows for each country the original names of the places of
purchase, their expenditure shares and our formality assignment.
We will investigate the robustness of our results to two alternative formality assign-
ment rules. The first alternative is to assign a non-binary probability to each category
that it pays VAT on its sales. We use the share of retailers that pay VAT in each category
in the Mexican census to obtain a probability for each category. These probabilities are
depicted in Panel C of Figure 1.19 This enables us to take into account the fact that some
small retailers pay taxes – either because a subset of small retailers are fully formal or be-
cause all small retailers pay VAT on a subset of their transactions. The second alternative
changes specialized stores (category 4) to be fully informal (leaving all other categories
unchanged). This is the category for which there is arguably the most uncertainty about
its true formality status.
Our formality assignment rule enables us to measure the informal budget share of
each household, defined as the share of its total expenditure purchased from informal
retailers. In what follows we also consider within-product informal budget shares. We
use the UN’s detailed COICOP classification of products, which is available at the 2-digit
19We assign the following probabilities that the place of purchase is formal to each category: 10% in
category 2; 20% in category 3; 50% in category 4; and 90% in category 5. Other categories are unchanged
from the baseline assignment rule.
8
level (12 products), 3-digit level (47 products) and 4-digit level (117 products).20
2.3 Extended Sample for Food Expenditures
We complement our core dataset with microdata from the World Bank’s Global Con-
sumption Database (GCD). The GCD compiles household expenditure surveys across
countries and harmonizes product categories across all surveys at the 2-digit COICOP
product level. 21 Merging this dataset with our core sample, we obtain consumption
data for 89 low and middle income countries which account for over 50% of the world
population. While this extended sample does not contain place of purchase informa-
tion, we can use it to characterize food consumption levels and food Engel curves. Food
products are defined as all items pertaining to the COICOP 2-digit category ‘food and
non-alcoholic beverages’. This category is a good proxy for the set of products which
most governments throughout the world tax at a reduced rate in an attempt to make
consumption taxes more progressive. We also compare food consumption trends in the
core and extended samples and find very similar patterns. This helps us argue that the
documented informal consumption facts, while only observed in the core sample, may
be relevant for the broader sample of developing countries.
3 Engel Curves of Informality and Food across Development
3.1 Informality Engel Curves
The informality Engel curve (IEC) traces the relationship between the informal budget
share and total household expenditure within a given country. As is commonly done
in developing countries, we use household expenditure to proxy for household income
because of issues with measuring income ( Deaton and Paxson, 1998; Atkin et al., 2018a).
We use the logarithm of total expenditure, in line with the large literature on product-
specific Engel curves (starting with Working, 1943; see review in Deaton, 1997).
For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 plots the IEC for one low-income country (Rwanda)
and one middle-income country (Mexico). These graphs show a local polynomial fit of
household budget share spent in the informal sector on log of household expenditure
per capita in 2010 constant USD. The solid and dashed lines represent the median and
20We use crosswalks to convert survey-specific product categories to COICOP categories when neces-
sary. This could not be done for three countries: Brazil, Chad and Peru. For these countries, we use
survey-specific product categories at the 3 and 4 digit levels.
21Aggregate statistics are available at http://datatopics.worldbank.org/consumption. Ap-
pendix B.3 provides further information on the dataset and our merge.
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top/bottom 5 percentiles of the expenditure distribution, respectively. To investigate
the functional form flexibly, we plot the non-parametric IEC constructed from kernel-
weighted polynomial local regressions. In both countries, the IEC is downward sloping
and approximately linear. In Rwanda, the informal budget share falls from 90% for
the poorest decile of households to 70% for the richest decile. In Mexico, the IEC is
steeper, falling from 55% to 25%. Figure A1 plots the IEC for all 31 countries. We find
two empirical regularities. First, IECs are downward sloping everywhere. Second, IECs
are approximately linear in log expenditure. This suggests there exists a stable func-
tional form relationship between informal budget share and household expenditure in
developing countries.22
To summarize the information contained in the country-level IECs, we focus on two
empirical moments: i) the aggregate informal budget share; ii) the level-log slope of
the IEC. In Section 4, we explain how these two moments are sufficient to characterize
how consumption patterns affect tax progressivity. We obtain the country-specific slopes
from the following regression:
Share In f ormali = bln(expenditurei) + #i (1)
where Share In f ormali is the informal budget share of household i, expenditurei is its
total expenditure per person. We use household weights from each survey.
In Figure 3, we plot the aggregate informal budget share (Panel A) and the estimated
IEC slope (Panel B) against countries’ per capita GDP. Panel A reveals a large drop in
the aggregate informal budget share, from over 90% in the poorest countries to 20% in
upper-middle income countries. This decrease in the size of the informal sector over
development, obtained using our novel approach based on consumer shopping behav-
ior, is consistent with patterns observed using alternative informality measures, based
on labor markets (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014; Morrow et al., 2019) or money demand
(Enste and Schneider, 2000). In Panel B, we see that the negative IEC slope first increases
in magnitude, between low-income and lower-middle income countries, and then de-
creases, between lower-middle and upper-middle income countries. The average IEC
slope is 9.8, implying a nearly 1 percentage point reduction in informal budget share
when household expenditure increases by 10%.
22Alma˚s (2012) similarly finds a stable Engel relationship between food budget share and household
income around the world. For more dis-aggregated expenditure categories, however, Engel curves have
been found to be non-linear and vary across settings (Banks et al., 1997; Atkin et al., 2018a).
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Robustness Our results are robust to using the alternative formality assignment rules
outlined in section 2.2. We re-estimate the informal budget shares and IEC slopes us-
ing these two alternative rules and present results in Figure A2. Our key findings are
unchanged: over development, the aggregate informal budget share decreases steeply
and the IEC slope first increases then decreases in magnitude. In Figures A4 and A5,
we show that this robustness is driven by the fact that those expenditure categories with
least uncertainty surrounding formality status are also those with the steepest Engel
slopes (including non-market purchases, large stores, and institutional services).
3.2 Understanding Differences in Informal Consumption across Households
Why do poorer households consume a higher share of their budget from the informal
sector? This question is important, for at least two reasons. First, by attempting to
answer it we investigate the mechanisms behind the shape of IECs. Second, if differ-
ences in informal consumption across households can be explained by characteristics
that governments can easily observe and target tax reductions or exemptions on, then
de jure redistributive policies and de facto informality exemption may in practice have
very similar redistributive impacts.
3.2.1 Observable Characteristics
To measure how much of the association between household income and informal con-
sumption shares can be explained by observable characteristics, we estimate the follow-
ing regression separately for each country:
Share In f ormali = b ⇤ ln(expenditurei) + GXi + #i (2)
where i indexes a household, Xi are household characteristics and each observation
is weighted by the relevant household survey weight. Table 2 shows the average of the
slope coefficients b across countries, the average upper and lower bounds of the 95%
confidence intervals, and the number of countries for which the coefficient is statistically
significant at the 5% level. Column 1 displays results from the specification without
controls. Column 2 controls for household demographics: household size and age, ed-
ucation and gender of the household head.23 We find that these characteristics do not
explain the correlation between informal expenditure and income and, if anything, the
IEC slopes become slightly steeper.
23Household size controls for economies of scale across households of different size which could affect
where households choose to shop - see Deaton and Paxson (1998).
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Columns 3 and 4 add controls for households’ location, either with an indicator
for whether the household lives in a rural area (column 3) or with survey block fixed
effects (column 4).24 These controls allow us to test whether the association between
informal budget shares and household expenditure is due to poorer households living in
areas with worse access to formal retailers. Despite large differences in average informal
budget shares between rural and urban households, controlling for rural locations only
explains 13% of the slopes.25 Controlling for survey blocks explains just over 20% of the
differences in informal budget shares between poor and rich households.
In columns 5 to 8 we test whether non-homothetic preferences across goods play
a role – when richer households spend more on goods predominantly sold in formal
stores. We run a product-level version of specification (2) with goods fixed effects and
compute an average goods-level estimate of b for each country.26 We gradually consider
variations within narrower goods categories: we first consider food vs non-food (column
5), then the 12 good categories of the COICOP 2-digit level classification (column 6), then
the 47 categories of the COICOP 3-digit level (column 7) and finally the 117 categories
at the COICOP 4-digit level (column 8). Preferences across goods explain part of the as-
sociation: controlling for food goods alone explains 35% of the slopes, while controlling
for the 12 broad goods categories explains 41% of the variation. Controlling for narrow
goods categories only slightly reduces the slope further.27
Finally, column 9 shows the average IEC slope with all controls included. The average
IEC slope is 4.3 and remains statistically significant in all but three countries. Overall,
observable characteristics explain 54% of the association between informal expenditure
shares and household income. We reproduce these results for our two alternative as-
signment rules and find similar results (see Tables A2 and A3).
3.2.2 Quality-Price Trade-off between the Formal and Informal Sectors
The previous analysis shows that observable location and preferences across goods ex-
plain half of the IEC slopes on average, but they remain significantly different from zero
in most countries after including these controls. In six countries in our sample the ex-
24The survey block is the most granular location information and contains on average 74 households in
our surveys. The median survey block is representative on average of 52,900 households.
25The informal budget share is on average 67% in rural areas versus 52% in urban areas and IEC slopes
are steeper in urban locations. Figure A7 shows the IECs separately for rural and urban areas.
26Formally we run the regression: Share In f ormalig = b ⇤ ln(expenditureg) + ag + GXi + #ig where
Share In f ormalig is the share of household i’s informal expenditure on good g and ag are goods fixed
effects. Each observation is weighted by household survey weights and goods expenditure shares.
27Figure A8 displays visually these results for each country by showing the residual IEC slopes when
controlling for increasingly narrow goods categories.
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penditure module asks households their main reason for choosing a place of purchase
for each item; the possible reasons are access, price, quality, store attributes and other.28
Table 3 reports the average frequencies for each reason. Column 1 shows that across all
store types, access is chosen for 41% of purchases, suggesting that controlling even at
the survey block might not capture fully the local nature of shopping preferences.29
Columns 2 and 3 show the same frequencies separately for informal and formal
stores. The key difference that emerges is that households visit informal stores for their
prices and formal stores for their quality.30 This result is robust to a set of controls and
to the inclusion of household fixed effects.31 Figure A9 shows that in each of the six
countries, this taste for quality is more prevalent for richer households, as they are up to
four times more likely to report quality as the reason for choosing any type of store.
These results suggest that part of the remaining association between informal bud-
get shares and household expenditure in the last column of Table 2 could be due to
richer households valuing high-quality goods more and such goods being sold mainly
in formal stores. This is in line with results in Faber and Fally (2017) who show that
richer households spend more on larger brands in the United States, and Atkin et al.
(2018b) who find that richer Mexican households spend more on high-quality products
sold by foreign retailers. This explanation could imply that formal varieties of a given
good should be more expensive than informal varieties, reflecting quality differences.
We test this hypothesis in the 20 core sample countries which report unit values for each
purchase. We use unit values to proxy for non-quality adjusted prices. We study price
differences between formal and informal stores within the most narrow good classifica-
tion available, location and measurement units, leading us to interpret price differences
as reflecting quality differences (similar to Atkin et al. (2018b)). We limit our analysis
to food products since this mitigates measurement issues and because food items are
typically exempt from consumption taxes, so that any price difference between formal
and informal varieties cannot be due to taxes. Formally, we estimate the price premium
in the formal sector in each country separately as follows:
28In all surveys, seven reasons are listed which we classify into five categories: access is defined as ”The
retailer is closer or more convenient” and ”The good or service cannot be found elsewhere”; price as ”The
good or services are cheaper”; quality as ”The goods or services are of better quality”; store attributes as
”The retailer offers credit” and ”The retailer is welcoming or is a friend”; and, other as ”Others reasons”.
29This could reflect the fact that many households in our sample cannot invest in costly durables, such
as cars, which may give them access to a wider variety of stores (Lagakos, 2016).
30Access is slightly more frequently reported as a reason to visit an informal store, which could reflect
a lack of store choices in poorer rural locations.
31Within a given household, formal store purchases appear motivated by higher quality while informal
store purchases appear driven by lower prices.
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ln(unit value)igmu = b Formaligmu + µgmu + eigmu (3)
where ln(unit value)igmu is the unit value reported by household i, for good g, in
location m, in units u, and Formaligmu equals one if the good is purchased in a formal
store. We add fixed effects at the good * location * unit of measurement level.
Table A5 shows that on average, food unit values are 6.7% higher in formal than
informal stores. This formal store premium result is robust to outliers, excluding self-
production, and controlling for household characteristics. These results are consistent
with the hypothesis that formal stores offer high quality varieties at a higher price.32
Formal stores might of course differ in other ways reflected in prices, such as a higher
productivity, which would make it less likely to find positive price differences.
3.3 Food Engel Curves
In this sub-section, we document the shape of the food Engel curve in developing coun-
tries. The shape of the IEC determines how much redistribution can be achieved by de
facto exemption of informal consumption; the shape of the food Engel curve similarly
determines how much de jure exemption of food can redistributive. Because food Engel
curves are typically downward sloping, many governments set reduced rates or fully
exempt food products for redistributive purposes.33 Previous research has studied the
magnitude and approximate log-level linearity of the food Engel curves.34 We combine
our core data with microdata from the Global Consumption Database (discussed in sec-
tion 2.3) to estimate food Engel curves in a uniquely large sample of 89 low and middle
income countries.
In the top panels of Figure 4, we present the aggregate food budget share (Panel
A) and food Engel slope (Panel B) against countries’ GDP per capita. The aggregate
budget share spent on food decreases with development, but the percentage-point drop
over development is less pronounced for food than for informal consumption. Food
Engel curves are typically downward sloping and there is no relationship between the
magnitude of the slope and development. In Panels C and D of4 we show the formal food
aggregate budget share and Engel curve slopes, respectively. The aggregate formal food
32Consistent with a quality-gradient in size, we also find that within formal retailers, the larger stores
(category 5) charge higher prices than smaller specialized stores formal category (category 4).
33Some countries apply reduced rates or exempt all food goods, while other countries target ‘basic’
food items. We follow the former approach; targeting narrow items may improve redistribution, but also
increases the scope for cross-goods misreporting and distortions.
34Recent studies include 10 countries in Alma˚s (2012), 22 in Anker et al. (2011) and 38 in Pritchett and
Spivack (2013).
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budget share is small on average (11%) but increases with development. The slope of the
formal food Engel curve is small in magnitude but positive on average in low-income
countries; it becomes negative in upper-middle income countries.
Finally, Panels A and B show that the levels and slopes of food Engel curves are
very similar between our core sample and extended sample, for countries at the same
level of development. This could suggest that while we can only characterize informal
consumption patterns in our core sample, our results may be relevant for developing
countries more broadly.
4 Progressivity of Consumption Taxes
The consumption patterns described in Section 3 determine the progressivity of con-
sumption taxes both in the average developing country and across development, which
we turn to in this section. We say a tax policy is progressive if the effective tax rate (ratio
of taxes paid to household income) increases with household income.
4.1 Progressivity in the Average Developing Country
Set-up We study the progressivity of three tax policy scenarios. Scenario #1 imposes a
uniform rate on all goods, but assumes informal varieties are not taxed (de facto exemp-
tion). Scenario #2 sets a zero rate on food goods (de jure exemption), but assumes formal
and informal varieties are taxed. Scenario #3 implements both de facto and de jure ex-
emptions by setting a zero rate on food and assuming informal varieties are not taxed.
Scenario #1 illustrates the progressivity of our new informality channel. Scenario #2
corresponds to a counterfactual setting with perfect enforcement capacity; while practi-
cally implausible, it provides an unconstrained benchmark against which to compare the
informality-constrained scenarios (#1 and #3). Scenario #3 captures the combined pro-
gressivity impacts of the government exemption policy and of informality. Importantly,
the difference between scenarios #3 and #1 shows the actual impact of governments im-
plementing a de jure exemption, conditional on the de facto informality exemption. We
assume for each scenario that the government sets rates such that it collects 10% of total
consumption in taxes, thus maintaining total revenue collected constant across scenar-
ios.35 Finally, we assume full pass-through of taxes to final consumers at baseline, but
relax this assumption below.
35Distributional analyses are based on the first order impacts of small changes in tax rates, which are
captured by the mechanical effects. Households’ behavioral responses to tax changes are second order.
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To build intuition for our results, we rely on the empirical evidence that the Engel
curves of both tax bases (formal goods, non-food goods) are upward sloping and ap-
proximately linear with respect to log household income, as shown in Section 3. With a
log-linear Engel curve, the progressivity of a tax scenario is decreasing in the aggregate
budget share of the tax base, and increasing in the magnitude of the slope of its Engel
curve. Consider two countries with the same positive slopes for a good, but different
aggregate budget shares. When Engel curves are log-linear, the difference in budget
shares spent on the taxed good between rich and poor households is more pronounced
in the country with the lower aggregate share. In other words, for the same Engel curve
slope the lower the average budget share of a taxed good, the more likely is it that any
given purchase of that good is made by a rich household. This means that a purchase
of that good becomes a better tag for household income, leading to a more progressive
tax system. In addition, when two countries have the same budget share of that good
and Engel curves are upward sloping, a steeper slope increases the difference in budget
shares between rich and poor households, making the tax system more progressive.
Results Figure 5 shows the progressivity of each scenario for the average developing
country in our sample. We obtain three main results. First, the existence of the informal
sector makes consumption taxes progressive. Under scenario #1 (red circle line), the
effective tax rate increases sharply with household income and the richest quintile pays
twice as much taxes (as a share of income) as the poorest quintile. This large progres-
sivity is explained by the steep increase of formal expenditure with household income
(Figure 3.) Second, the de facto exemption of the informal sector is more progressive
than the de jure exemption of food goods in the counterfactual setting with perfect en-
forcement. This can be observed by comparing scenario #1 to #2 (green cross line): the
ratio of effective tax rate paid by the richest quintile to that of the poorest quintile is
almost 50% larger under #1 versus #2. This difference is primarily driven by the fact
that formal expenditure constitutes on average a smaller budget share of households’
incomes than non-food expenditure among countries in our sample (Panel A, Figure 4
versus Figure 3). Third, the progressivity achieved by the de jure exemption conditional
on the de facto exemption is small. We can see this by comparing scenario #3 (orange
square line) to scenario #1: exempting food from taxation barely increases progressivity
once the exemption of the informal sector is taken into account.
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4.2 Progressivity across Development
The evidence presented in Figure 5 for the average country masks considerable hetero-
geneity across countries. We now turn to characterizing how the progressivity of our
policy scenarios changes over the development path. To summarize the progressivity of
a scenario we use the ratio of the effective tax rate paid by the richest quintile to that
paid by the poorest quintile. The higher this metric, the more progressive the tax policy
(a value > 1 implies a progressive tax policy). This metric does not depend on the tax
rate used, and is frequently used in the literature (Sah, 1983; Srinivasan, 1989).
Figure 6 plots the country-level progressivity for each scenario as a function of coun-
tries’ economic development. Panel A shows that the de facto exemption of informal
consumption leads to the most progressivity in the poorest countries, where the top
20% pay on average 3 times as much in taxes as the bottom 20%. In these countries
formal consumption is rare and therefore a strong tag for household income. Over de-
velopment, progressivity decreases. This is primarily driven by the steep increase in
aggregate formal budget shares (Figure 3, Panel A), which makes formal consumption a
worse tag for income as countries become richer. Between low and lower-middle income
countries, this negative budget share effect dominates the positive effect on progressivity
from a rise in the slope of the formal Engel curve (Figure 3, Panel B). Between lower-
middle and upper-middle income countries, the formal Engel slope falls, contributing to
the decrease in progressivity.
In Panel B of Figure 6, we study progressivity of the de jure food exemption in the
unrealistic setting with perfect enforcement and no informal consumption (scenario #2).
The de jure food exemption is substantially less progressive than the de facto informal
sector exemption (scenario #1) in the poorest countries, while both scenarios achieve
similar levels of progressivity in upper-middle income countries. This is because the
non-food budget share is much larger than the formal budget share in the poorest coun-
tries (making formal consumption a much better tag for household income than non-
food consumption), and grows much less than formal budget shares over development
(Figure 4). Finally, by comparing Panel C (scenario #3) to Panel A (scenario #1), we find
that de jure exemptions have no effect on progressivity in the poorest countries once
the de facto exemption of the informal sector is taken into account. It has a positive
impact however in upper-income-countries. This is because the formal food Engel curve
is roughly flat in poor countries, and downward sloping among the richest countries in
our sample (Figure 4).
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4.3 Extensions and Robustness
Pass-through of taxes in the informal sector Our analysis thus far assumes zero pass-
through of taxes to prices of informal varieties. This assumption may not hold, for
several reasons. First, if the consumption tax is a VAT, informal retailers may pay taxes
on their inputs from formal suppliers. Second, competition between formal and informal
retailers could lead informal retailers to pass through tax increases to prices. We relax
this assumption by allowing some pass-through of taxes to informal prices. In Appendix
C.6, we show that under a VAT system the pass-through of taxes to informal prices is
equal to the share of formal input costs in informal retailers’ total input costs. Using the
Mexican census data described above we find that this share is on average 10% among
all informal retailers.36
Table A6 summarizes our progressivity results under the assumption of a 10% pass-
through of taxes to informal prices.37 The results are partially affected but our key
findings remain. First, we find that scenario #1 (exemption of informal varieties) remains
very progressive, with the richest quintile paying over 70%more in taxes than the poorest
quintile on average. Second, the de facto exemption of the informal sector continues to
be more progressive than de jure exemption of food (scenario #2), although the difference
in progressivity has decreased. Third, the progressivity impact of the de jure exemption,
conditional on allowing for informal consumption, remains smaller than that of the de
facto exemption.
Distributional savings rates Our baseline results use total expenditures to proxy for
household income, assuming households do not save. Intuitively, allowing for savings
both decreases effective tax rates (as savings are not taxed) and decreases the progressiv-
ity of all tax scenarios if saving rates increase with income.38 The distribution of savings
across income levels is hard to obtain from expenditure surveys, especially in develop-
36In the 2013 Census, 85% of retailers are informal by not reporting any payment on VAT. Among infor-
mal retailers, only 8% report paying VAT on inputs, which applies on average to 40% of their intermediate
input purchases. The informal retailers that report positive VAT on inputs account for 25% of all informal
sales. Combined, this leads to our estimate of 10%.
37The share of formal inputs used by informal firms is likely to be an upper bound. First, the 10%
number is applied to both fixed and non-fixed establishments, while the latter category (which includes
street stalls) is likely to source fewer inputs from formal firms. For this reason, we maintain a 0% pass-
through for home production. Second, in Mexico, it is the large informal stores which use formal inputs:
The use of formal inputs for smaller stores is closer to 5% on average. Third, segmentation between formal
and informal firms is likely to be even larger in poorer countries, leading to lower average pass-through
in those countries than in Mexico.
38Calculations based on annual income may overstate the regressive nature of consumption taxes
since consumption depends on lifetime income, which is less volatile than annual income (Poterba, 1989;
Caspersen and Metcalf, 1994).
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ing countries where income is hard to measure. To assess how savings could affect our
results, we use data from the US Consumer Finance Survey, in which savings rates range
from 0% for the poorest households to 15% for the richest quintile.39 Results are pre-
sented in Table A6: allowing for distributional savings decreases the progressivity of all
scenarios, as expected, but our main findings are unchanged.
Alternative formality assignment Finally Table A6 presents our progressivity results
under the two alternative rules for categorizing places of purchases as formal or in-
formal, as described in Section 2.2 (the probabilistic formality assignment based on the
2013 Mexican Census of retailers and the assignment of specialized stores to the informal
sector). Our three main take-aways are unchanged.
5 Optimal Consumption Tax Policy with an Informal Sector
5.1 Set-up
This section studies the implications of the novel consumption facts for optimal tax
policy. We extend the multi-person Ramsey model of commodity taxation (Diamond,
1975) to a context in which informal varieties of each good cannot be taxed. We then
derive optimal tax rates for three policy scenarios and study the changes in optimal rates
as consumption patterns change over development. The scenarios are closely related to
those in Section 4, but studying optimal tax policy enables us to relax the assumption
that differentiating tax rates between food and non-food goods must take the form of
full tax exemption of food. We study instead the optimal level of rate differentiation
between these two goods categories.40 Proofs of results are in Appendix C.
Household preferences There is a continuum of mass 1 of households i with hetero-
geneous exogenous incomes yi. Households have preferences over j goods, and for each
good over two varieties v, which we assume are imperfect substitutes. The subscript
v = 0 indicates a variety produced in the informal sector, v = 1 a variety produced in
the formal sector. In most of what follows we assume informal varieties cannot be taxed.
Producer prices qjv are exogenous, consumer prices are given by pj1 = qj1(1+ tj), where
39Source: 1985 US Consumer Finance Survey. Savings rates are in the same range in the few developing
countries (China and Chile) for which similar consumer finance surveys are available.
40We focus in this section on optimal rate differentiation between these two categories only for simplic-
ity, and because of the policy relevance of this scenario. Our expressions can however be used to consider
a government that optimally differentiates rates across a large number of categories; we show results from
this full rate differentiation in Section 6.2 below.
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tj is the tax on good j, and pj0 = qj0. These consumer prices reflect the commonly made
assumption that there is full (no) pass-through of taxes to formal (informal) consumer
prices.41 We write v(p, yi) the indirect utility of household i, sijv the budget share that
household i spends on variety v of good j, sij = s
i
j0 + s
i
j1 the budget share it spends on
good j, and ej the price elasticity of demand for good j.
We impose additional structure on household preferences to characterize how the
efficiency cost of taxation changes along the development path. We assume that com-
pensated price elasticities of demand for all goods are equal across households, across
products and with development. We set elasticities of substitution across goods equal to
zero but allow a positive cross-price elasticity of demand across varieties. This enables
us to focus on households’ responses that arise in the presence of an informal sector due
to substitution across varieties within each good. This substitution is governed by the
cross-variety price elasticities of demand, which are assumed equal across all goods and
invariant along the development path. We allow for differences in income elasticities
across goods and varieties but assume income effects are fixed across development.
Imposing this structure on preferences allows us to clearly determine how uncom-
pensated price elasticities, which drive the efficiency costs of taxation, vary across prod-
ucts and along the development path. In Appendix C, we show that the uncompensated
price elasticity of demand for a formal variety of a good, denoted ej1, can be expressed
as a function of compensated price elasticities, income elasticities, and budget shares:
ej1 = e
C   hj1sj1   2e˜Caj (4)
This elasticity captures the efficiency cost of taxing only the formal variety of good
j and is composed of three components. The first is the compensated price elasticity of
demand for a good, eC. The second is an income effect driven by the income elasticity
of demand for the formal variety hj1 and its budget share sj1. The third is a function of
the compensated cross-price elasticity of demand, denoted e˜C, and the share of informal
consumption in total consumption of good j, denoted aj.42 Intuitively, as the price of
formal varieties increases, households can substitute to informal varieties: this increases
the price elasticity of the formal variety, the more so the more households are willing to
substitute across varieties (higher e˜C).
41Appendix C shows that a simple model in which formal and informal firms compete under monop-
olistic competition yields these patterns of pass-through.
42This expression also assumes variety-level own-price elasticities of demand are equal across varieties
for each good, and differences in prices across varieties are negligible, such that pj0 ⇡ pj1. Section 3
presents evidence regarding the value of p1p0 . In all countries the difference between prices of formal and
informal varieties is small, around 5%.
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Government preferences The government chooses the tax rates tj levied on each good
j to maximize:
W =
Z
i
G(v(p, yi))di+ µÂ
j
tjqj1xj1 (5)
where xj1 =
R
i x
i
j1(p, y
i) is total consumption of the formal variety of good j. Govern-
ment preferences are characterized by µ, the marginal value of public funds, and G(), an
increasing and concave social welfare function. We write gi household i’s social marginal
welfare weight, which represents how much the government values giving an extra unit
of income to household i, and g¯ is the average social marginal welfare weight (see Saez
and Santcheva, 2016).43 We assume that gi is decreasing with household income and
µ = g¯. The latter simplifies expressions and corresponds to a government that has no
preference assumption for taxation unless it enables redistribution.
5.2 Optimal Tax Policy over the Development Path
In this sub-section, we consider how optimal tax policies vary with development. We
model development as an increase in all households’ income by the same proportional
amount, so that the distribution of income across households does not change, and
assume it leads to the changes in budget shares and Engel curve slopes documented in
Section 3. To build intuition, and consistent with our empirical evidence, we assume
that the Engel curves of all taxed goods are approximately linear with respect to log
household income. We relax this assumption when we calibrate the model to our data.
We first consider optimal uniform taxation in a world in which only formal varieties
can be taxed. We then consider optimal rate differentiation between food and non-food
goods: first in a counterfactual setting with perfect enforcement where all varieties can
be taxed; then, in the realistic setting in which only formal varieties can be taxed.
5.2.1 Optimal Uniform Commodity Taxation
We start by assuming that the government levies a uniform tax rate on all products,
tj = t, 8j, but cannot tax informal varieties. Writing t = t1+t , welfare maximization
yields the following expression for the optimal uniform rate:
t⇤ =
R
i(g¯  gi)fi
si1
s1
di
 e1 g¯ (6)
43Formally gi = ∂G(v(p,y
i))
∂v(p,yi)
∂v(p,yi)
∂yi .
21
where s1 = Âj
R
i s
i
j1di is the aggregate budget share spent on all formal varieties, f
i =
yi
y¯ is the ratio of household i’s income relative to the average income y¯ and e1 is the
uncompensated price elasticity of demand for all formal varieties. Equation (6) shows
that the optimal uniform rate is increasing in the co-variance between household income
and formal budget shares: the more richer households spend on formal varieties relative
to the poor, the more redistribution is obtained from taxing only formal varieties and
the higher the optimal rate on those varieties. The optimal rate is also decreasing in
the absolute value of the uncompensated price elasticity of demand for formal varieties:
the more households respond to changes in formal prices by consuming fewer formal
varieties, the higher the efficiency cost of taxing only those formal varieties.
The change in the optimal uniform rate over the development path is given by:
∂t⇤
t⇤ =
R
i(g¯  gi)fi
si1
s1
(
∂si1
si1
  ∂s1s1 )diR
i(g¯  gi)fi
si1
s1
di
+
∂e1
e1
(7)
The first and second terms capture, respectively, the change in the redistributive
effect and efficiency cost of taxing only formal varieties. The direction of these changes
is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Optimal uniform commodity taxation when only formal varieties can be
taxed
• The redistribution gain from taxing all products uniformly is decreasing over the develop-
ment path as long as: i) the formal Engel curve is upward sloping, ii) the aggregate formal
budget share increases more than the slope of the formal Engel curve.
• The efficiency cost of taxing all products uniformly is decreasing over the development path
as long as, in addition, e˜C > h12 , where h1 is the income elasticity of demand for all formal
varieties e˜C is the cross-variety price elasticity of demand.
Proof: see Appendix C.
The first part of Proposition 1 formalizes the intuition (outlined in Section 4) for how
changes in the aggregate formal budget shares and slope of the formal Engel curve af-
fect the redistributive effect of taxing formal varieties. As shown above, formal Engel
curves are upward sloping in all countries. Among poorest countries, the likelihood
that a formal variety purchase is made by rich households is high because the aggregate
formal budget share is small. As this budget share increases with development, formal
22
purchases become a worse tag for higher household income. This decreases the redis-
tribution gain from taxing all formal varieties, and therefore pushes the optimal rate
on these varieties downwards, as long as the slope of the formal Engel curve does not
increase substantially with development.
The second part of Proposition 1 states the conditions under which efficiency consid-
erations will on the contrary push the optimal uniform rate upwards over development.
The increase in aggregate formal consumption share over development lowers the op-
portunities for substitution towards informal varieties; this decreases the efficiency cost
of taxing all formal varieties (see equation 4). At the same time, the growth in formal
consumption share increases the responses to changes in prices due to income effects,
which leads to higher efficiency costs. The first effect dominates as long as e˜C > h12 .
Overall, the presence of large informal sectors in poorer countries tends to increase both
the redistributive gain and the efficiency cost of taxing consumption relative to richer
countries with smaller informal sectors.
5.2.2 Optimal Rate Differentiation When All Varieties Can Be Taxed
We now turn to a government which sets a different rate on food and non-food goods.
We start by considering rate differentiation under the assumption that the government
has perfect enforcement capacity and can therefore tax both formal and informal vari-
eties.44 This unrealistic assumption enables us to consider how optimal rate differen-
tiation would change over the development path in the absence of an informal sector
and provides a ’no enforcement constraint’ benchmark against which to compare more
realistic scenarios in the following section. The optimal rate on product j is given by:
t⇤j =
R
i(g¯  gi)fi
sij
sj
di
 ej g¯ (8)
This expression shows that the optimal rate is increasing in the co-variance between
household income and budget share spent on good j. We know from Section 3 that the
slopes of all non-food (food) Engel curves are positive (negative). Holding efficiency
considerations constant, this implies that the optimal policy taxes food less than non-
food goods.
The following proposition characterizes the change in the optimal tax on food relative
to non-food over the development path.
44Formally we assume that tj is levied on both xj1 and xj0, so that pj0 = qj0(1+ tj).
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Proposition 2. Optimal rate differentiation when all varieties can be taxed
• The redistribution gain from taxing food less than non-food goods is increasing over the
development path as long as: i) food Engel curves are downward sloping, ii) aggregate
food budget shares decrease, iii) the aggregate food budget share is lower than the aggregate
non-food budget share, iv) food Engel curves do not flatten too much.
• In addition, the efficiency cost of taxing food less than non-food products increases with
development as long as non-food budget shares increase.
Proof: see Appendix C.
The first part of proposition 2 states the conditions under which the redistribution
gain from rate differentiation increases over development. Intuitively, for a given Engel
curve slope, this redistribution gain is minimized when food and non-food aggregate
budget shares are equal: in this case, observing a food or non-food purchase yields
little information about a household’s income, such that differentiating rates across these
categories has little redistributive effect. This is the situation in the poorest countries in
our sample where food and non-food goods are consumed in roughly equal proportions.
As countries grow the food budget shares fall, so food purchases become a better tag for
household income. This increases the optimal level of rate differentiation (decreasing the
optimal rate on food relative to non-food) over the development path, as long as food
Engel curves do not flatten too much. 45
The second part of Proposition 2 states that efficiency considerations will on the con-
trary increase the optimal rate on food relative to non-food over development (decrease
rate differentiation). The intuition for this stems from the fact that the average budget
share spent on food falls while that spent on non-food products increases as countries
grow. This decreases the efficiency cost of taxing food relative to non-food products due
to income effects.
5.2.3 Optimal Rate Differentiation When Only Formal Varieties Can Be Taxed
Finally, we consider optimal rate differentiation under the more realistic assumption that
informal varieties cannot be taxed. The optimal rate on product j when only variety j1
can be taxed is now given by:
45Condition iii) is not strictly necessary, but constitutes the relevant empirical setting we observe in Sec-
tion 3: food budget shares are typically smaller than non-food budget shares in our sample. In Appendix
Section C, we show that proposition 2 holds even when the food budget share is higher that the non-food
budget share, as long as the slope of the food Engel curve increase sufficiently in magnitude as countries
develop.
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The following proposition characterizes the change in the optimal tax on food relative
to non-food products over the course of development when only formal varieties can be
taxed.
Proposition 3. Optimal rate differentiation when only formal varieties can be taxed
• The redistribution gain from taxing food less than non-food products is increasing over
the development path as long as: i) the slope of the Engel curve for formal food varieties
decreases relative to that for formal non-food varieties, ii) the aggregate budget share of
formal non-food varieties does not increase much faster than the aggregate budget share of
formal food varieties.
• The efficiency cost of taxing food less than non-food products increases with development
as long as, in addition, the informal share of food consumption falls faster than that of
non-food consumption.
Proof: see Appendix C.
The first part of Proposition 3 states under what conditions equity considerations
push the optimal rate of food down relative to that on non-food goods over the devel-
opment path. As discussed above, the Engel curve slopes for formal food varieties are
very close to zero in the poorest countries in our sample. In these countries subsidizing
food relative to non-food products will therefore not necessarily be equity-improving.
As countries grow however the Engel curve slopes of formal non-food varieties grow,
whilst those of formal food varieties fall (see Figure 4). This change in slopes increases
the redistributive gain from subsidizing food relative to non-food over the development
path, as long as the aggregate budget share of formal non-food products does not in-
crease too much with development relative to that of formal food products.
The second part of Proposition 3 states that, in contrast, efficiency considerations tend
to push the optimal relative rate on food down over development. Recall from expression
(4) that the efficiency cost of taxing only the formal variety of a good is increasing in the
share of informal consumption in total consumption of that good. Over the development
path these informal shares fall, lowering the efficiency cost of taxing both food and non-
food products. They fall faster for food products than for non-food products, however
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(see Figure A12). This implies that the efficiency cost of taxing formal food varieties
drops faster than that of taxing non-food formal varieties as countries grow. 46
6 Implications for Redistribution and Inequality
This section presents the implications of our results for the impact of consumption tax
policy on disposable income inequality in developing countries. The extent to which a
tax policy redistributes across households depends on both its progressivity (studied in
Section 4) and the average effective tax rate levied. The latter is itself a function of the
level of the statutory tax rates, which we obtain from our model, and the size of the tax
base, which varies across tax scenarios. We calibrate the optimal tax rates in section 6.1,
and then calculate the effect of different tax policy scenarios on inequality in section 6.2.
6.1 Calibrated Optimal Tax Rates
This sub-section calibrates the optimal tax rates defined in expressions (6), (8) and (9).
Table 4 summarizes our choice of calibration parameters. We calibrate several param-
eters directly from our data: we use the observed budget shares described in section
3, total household expenditure to proxy for household income, the slopes of the Engel
curves to obtain income elasticities, and the observed informal budget shares for each
good and country.47 We relax our theoretical assumptions that Engel curves are log-
linear and that inequality is fixed, using instead the observed budget shares and income
distributions in each country. We consider a range [1,2] for the cross-variety compen-
sated price elasticity. This is in line with estimates in Faber and Fally (2017) and Atkin
et al. (2018b), and we use 1.5 as our baseline value, while setting a value of -0.7 for the
own-price compensated elasticity of goods. Together, these parameters yield values for
the own-price uncompensated elasticity of goods that are in the [ 2.2, 0.7] range, in
line with estimates from the literature (Deaton et al., 1994). Finally, we specify govern-
ment preferences by setting a social welfare weight for households in each decile of the
household expenditure distribution in each country. Our specification implies that gov-
ernments place 10 times more weight on income received by households in the poorest
decile than in the richest decile. Our calibration choices yield optimal uniform rates in
46In addition, it must be that the aggregate budget share of formal non-food products does not increase
much faster than that of formal food products over development. This ensures that behavioral responses
to taxation through income effects do not increase much faster for food products.
47Our model calls for using budget shares observed under a counterfactual ’no tax or transfers’ scenario.
We do not attempt to adjust observed budget shares to take into account the fact that they are affected
by current tax systems as this would require an in-depth understanding of the tax and transfer system in
each country in our sample which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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the 10% to 25% range, in line with the range of statutory consumption tax rates set by
developing countries. Appendix D details our calibration choices further.
Figure 7 plots the country-level ratio of optimal food to non-food rate (the relative
food subsidy) as a function of economic development. The left two panels refer to the
counterfactual scenario where all varieties are taxed; the right panels refer to the more
realistic scenario where only formal varieties are taxed. The top panels show calibrated
rates holding uncompensated price elasticities constant over development: in these fig-
ures all the variation across countries is due to varying redistribution gains from dif-
ferentiating rates. The bottom panels allow price elasticities to vary with development:
here, the variation is due to both redistribution gains and efficiency costs.48
There are two main take-aways from Figure 7. First, consistent with our model pre-
dictions, we find that over development, equity considerations tend to decrease the rate
on food relative to non-food goods (thus increasing rate differentiation) but efficiency
considerations tend to increase it. Equity effects dominate, so that optimal relative rates
on food fall with development when both effects are taken into account. Second, com-
paring panels B and D, we see that once we take into account the fact that only formal
varieties can be taxed, the optimal policy no longer subsidizes food relative to non-food
in some poor countries (the ratio of food to non-food rates is higher than 1). Once the
impossibility of taxing informal varieties is accounted for, taxing food less than non-
food goods cannot by justified on equity or on efficiency grounds in these countries.
Appendix Figure A14 shows that both of these findings are robust to changing values of
the cross-variety price elasticity.49
6.2 Effect of Consumption Tax Policy on Inequality
Figure 8 presents the effects of different consumption tax scenarios on income inequality
in the average country in our sample. In Panel A we use the calibrated optimal tax rates
for each scenario (allowing efficiency costs to vary with development) and use these
rates to calculate the net of tax income of each household in our data. Our redistribution
metric is the percent change in Gini from the pre-tax income distribution to the net-
of-tax distribution. To benchmark our results against estimates in the literature, Panel
48Formally, in the top panels we set the uncompensated price elasticities in expressions equal to -1
for all countries when calibrating expressions (6), (8) and (9). In the bottom panels we calibrate these
elasticities using expression (4) and the parameter values detailed in Table 4.
49In Appendix Figure A13 we also show the calibrated optimal uniform rates on all formal varieties.
Consistent with our theory, the optimal uniform rate falls over development for redistributive purposes.
As predicted, allowing efficiency costs to vary with development lowers the optimal rates, especially in
the poorest countries and more so the higher the cross-variety elasticity of substitution.
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B reports the inequality impacts of actual tax policies in place in a comparable sample
of developing countries obtained by Lustig (2018). To calculate these effects, we use
their Commitment to Equity (CEQ) database which contains information on income and
estimates of taxes paid (consumption taxes, direct taxes and social security) for each
income decile in 25 developing countries.50 Importantly, their methodology does not
systematically consider the possibility that some places of purchase may be informal,
and therefore cannot take into account the redistributive effect of de facto exemption of
informal consumption.
Several key results emerge from Figure 8. First, our different optimal consumption
tax policy scenarios achieve substantial inequality reduction. The inequality effects are
large compared to estimates of the effect of current consumption tax policies, which sug-
gest consumption taxes in developing countries achieve very little inequality reduction
(0.3% reduction in Gini, row 1 of Panel B), despite taking into account reduced rates
and exemptions. On the contrary, when we consider the de facto exemption of informal
varieties, simply setting a uniform rate on all goods achieves a non-trivial inequality
reduction (a 2.3% decrease in the Gini, row 1 of Panel A). Second, the amount of re-
distribution achieved by this scenario is still large when we compare it to a scenario
with perfect enforcement in which governments optimally differentiate rates on food
and non-food products (row 2 of Panel A). Comparing rows 1 and 2 of Panel A, we see
that taxing only formal varieties achieves 75% of the inequality reduction obtained under
the perfect enforcement and de jure rate differentiation scenario.51 Third, introducing
rate differentiation on top of de facto exemption of the informal sector further reduces
inequality (row 3 of Panel A). Comparing rows 1 and 3, however, we see that simply
setting a uniform rate on all goods achieves two-third of the redistribution obtained by
optimally differentiating rates once we assume that only formal varieties can be taxed.
Finally, by comparing panel A to row 2 of Panel B, we find that our estimated ef-
fects of consumption tax policy on inequality have the same magnitude as the effect of
50In the first row of Panel B, we calculate the change in Gini from applying general consumption and
excise taxes to disposable income plus indirect subsidies. In the second row of Panel B, we calculate the
change in Gini from applying the direct tax and social security contributions to market income plus direct
cash transfers. These exercises allow us to calculate the marginal Gini impacts of the indirect and direct
tax systems, respectively.
51Optimally differentiating rates when all varieties are taxed reduces inequality substantially, despite
the relatively small progressivity achieved by differentiating rates on food and non-food described in
section 4.3. It occurs because this (unrealistic) scenario assumes the government can tax the entire con-
sumption base, which yields much higher effective tax rates.
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the direct tax system (income taxes and social security) in developing countries.52 We
note however that the redistributive potential of direct tax systems in these countries is
constrained because they only cover the small share of the workforce which is not self-
employed (Jensen, 2019). Direct tax systems that do not face this constraint have a much
larger effect on inequality.53
6.3 Extensions and Discussion
Full rate differentiation We have thus far only considered scenarios in which gov-
ernments set at most two tax rates, on food and non-food goods. How much more
inequality reduction can be achieved if we allow for different rates on each of the 12
large COICOP 2-digit good categories? To answer this, we calibrate optimal tax rates at
the level of each good and for each country and recompute the changes in Gini.54 The
last two rows of Table A7 display the results. In the realistic case with an informal sector
(last row), the inequality reduction achieved by full rate differentiation is 30% higher
than that achieved by simply differentiating rates between food and non-food goods.
Given that administrative costs from managing multiple rates may be high (Ebrill et al.,
2001), this result further suggests a limited role for rate differentiation across goods in
developing countries.
Robustness Table A7 reports a large range of robustness checks on our inequality re-
sults. First, we show that results are broadly robust to the checks implemented in Section
4 for the progressivity results. In particular, allowing for some pass-through of taxes to
prices in the informal sector has two opposite effects on inequality which tend to cancel
each other out. On the one hand, it decreases the progressivity of consumption tax sce-
narios in which the informal sector is exempt, as seen in Section 4. On the other hand,
it increases the tax base (and therefore the aggregate effective tax rates), which reduces
inequality. The first effect dominates slightly, leading to marginally lower effects on
inequality. Allowing for distributional saving rates reduces the inequality effects, espe-
cially in the counterfactual scenario in which all varieties are assumed to be taxed, but
our main results are unchanged. Changing the rule used to assign a place of purchase
to the formal or informal sector similarly leaves our key results qualitatively unchanged.
52Since direct taxes are generally considered most strongly suited for redistribution, our results are
large in magnitude among tax policy impacts. They are, however, smaller in magnitude than the inequality
reduction achieved in CEQ-countries by in-cash and in-kind transfers (Lustig, 2018).
53Using data from the OECD Income Distribution Database, we calculate that direct taxes in developed
countries achieve a 11.2% Gini-reduction in inequality.
54Formally, we re-calibrate expressions (8) and (9) for each good and country.
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Second, in the final two rows of Table A7 we present results using alternative values of
the cross-variety price elasticity of demand. This is the parameter which governs the
strength of the efficiency cost of taxation. Our results are largely unchanged.
Absence of direct tax instruments Our result that optimal indirect taxes are robustly
redistributive is derived in a model where no direct tax instrument is available. A central
result in public finance is that redistribution is better achieved through direct rather than
indirect taxes (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976; Jacobs and Boadway, 2014). However, this
theoretical result relies on the assumption that income taxes cannot be evaded, which is
at odds with reality in developing countries (Jensen, 2019). When income taxes can be
evaded, a greater redistributive role is found for indirect tax instruments (Boadway et al.,
1994; Huang and Rios, 2016).55 This discussion suggests that an extended model with di-
rect tax instruments, even constrained, would lead to less optimal redistribution through
consumption taxes. Jointly studying the optimal direct and indirect tax instruments over
development would, however, require additional empirical moments, including how op-
portunities to evade income taxes vary along a country’s income distribution and as the
country develops. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this paper.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies how consumption patterns vary with household income both within
and across countries and derive implications for the optimal design and redistributive
potential of consumption taxes. We consider two channels for redistribution: the de
facto tax exemption of informal expenditure and the de jure tax exemption of necessi-
ties, in particular food. To measure informal expenditure, we harmonize expenditure
surveys across 31 developing countries that contain information on the store type for
each transaction. We assign each store type to the informal or formal sector using a
robust assignment rule, and calculate the informal budget share at the household level.
This enables us to characterize the Informality Engel Curves: we find that informal bud-
get shares decrease with household income in every country. This implies that the de
facto exemption of the informal sector is progressive. We then extend the standard op-
timal commodity tax model to allow for informal consumption and calibrate it to our
data to study the effects of different tax policies on inequality. Contrary to the consen-
55For example, Huang and Rios (2016) find that incorporating income tax evasion and the existence of a
consumption tax reduces the optimal income tax by 28%. Note that Boadway et al. (1994) and Huang and
Rios (2016) both assume consumption taxes are perfectly enforceable. Given our findings, incorporating
consumption tax evasion in their models would further reinforce the redistributive role of indirect taxes.
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sus view, we show that consumption taxes are redistributive and lower inequality by
as much as personal income taxes in developing countries. This effect is mainly driven
by the existence of the informal sector. Once informal consumption is accounted for,
reduced rates on necessities have a limited impact on inequality.
Our findings have sharp implications for the use of reduced rates on necessities and
on food items in particular. We find that differentiating rates across goods has limited
redistributive potential once informal consumption is accounted for. In particular, these
policies have no redistributive impact in some of the poorest countries. As practice
shows, removing reduced rates on food and other necessities is often met with fierce
resistance. An equity-improving policy would most likely have to combine the removal
of reduced rates with further investments in transfer programs and social protection
(Hanna and Olken, 2018).
Our results do not imply that tax administrations should abandon their efforts to re-
duce the size of the informal sector. Rather, they caution that any benefits from reducing
the informal sector’s size should be weighed against potential equity costs. Our findings
call more generally for future research on tax enforcement policies to take into account
not only their impact on efficiency but also their distributional effects.
Finally, we note that in most countries firms below a size threshold are exempt from
taxation. This policy is motivated by the large enforcement costs tax administrations
incur when trying to tax these firms, and the compliance costs to the firms themselves
(Keen and Mintz, 2004). The growing availability of digital technologies lowers these
costs and makes it possible to bring increasingly smaller firms into the tax net, thus
removing the administrative rationale for tax exempting small firms (Gupta et al., 2017).
However, our results suggest that this policy can still be justified on equity grounds.
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Figure 1: Employment Size, Store Types & Formality
(a) # Employees on Formality in Retail Censuses
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These panels shows the association between formality status, employment and firm type. Panel A shows
the share of formal firms as a function of log employment, using retail censuses of four core sample
countries (Cameroon, Mexico, Peru and Rwanda). Formality is defined as ’being registered with the
tax authority’ in Cameroon and Rwanda, and ’paying Value-Added-Taxes on sales’ in Mexico and Peru.
Panels B and C use the 2013 Mexican retail census, which classifies retailers in similar categories as our
broad place of purchase taxonomy. The figures show the log median number of employees by place of
purchase (Panel C) and the share of firms paying Value-Added-Taxes on sales (Panel C). The data comes
from the following firm censuses, keeping only firms which operate in the retail sector: Recensement
Ge´ne´ral des entreprises 2016 (Cameroun), Censo Econo´mico 2014 (Mexico), Censo Nacional Econo´mico
2008 (Peru), Establishment Census 2011 (Rwanda).
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Figure 2: Selected Informality Engel Curves
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These panels show the local polynomial fit of the Informality Engel Curves in Rwanda (Panel A) and
Mexico (Panel B). Per person total expenditure on the horizontal axis is measured in log. Informal budget
share is on the vertical axis. The shaded area around the polynomial fit corresponds to the 95% confidence
interval. The solid grey line corresponds to the median of each country’s expenditure distribution, while
the dotted lines correspond to the 5th and 95th percentiles. See Appendix Figure A1 for each core sample
country’s informality Engel curve.
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Figure 3: Informal Expenditure Across Countries
(a) Informal Budget Share
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(b) Informality Engel Curve Slope
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Panel A plots country-level informal budget shares on log per capita GDP. The average informal budget
share is 52%. Panel B shows the slope of the informality Engel curves on log per capita GDP. The average
slope is 9.8. The bars correspond to the 95% confidence interval of the slope coefficient. GDP per capita is
in constant 2010 USD (Source: World Bank WDI).
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Figure 4: Food Expenditure Across Countries
(a) Food Budget Share
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(b) Food Engel Curve Slope
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(c) Formal Food Budget Share
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(d) Formal Food Engel Curve Slope
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This figure combine two sources: data from the core-sample of 31 countries and data from the Global
Consumption Database (GCD) which adds 58 developing countries not included in the core-sample. Panel
A shows each country’s food budget share, plotted against log per capita GDP. The average food budget
share in the core sample is 49%, while the average in the GCD sample is 48%. Panel B shows the country-
specific slope of the food Engel curve, plotted against log per capita GDP. The average slope in the core
sample is 12.5, while the average in the GCD sample is 13. The lines correspond to local polynomial
fits. GDP per capita is in constant 2010 USD (Source: World Bank WDI). Panels C and D are constructed
similarly to Panel A and B, but for formal food expenditure which can only be measured in the core
sample.
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Figure 5: Progressivity of Tax Policy Scenarios
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This figure plots the share of expenditures that is paid in taxes (effective tax rates), by decile, for each
tax scenario. The three scenarios are simulated in all 31 countries, each point corresponds to the average
effective tax rates of each decile across all countries in our sample. The red-circle line corresponds to a tax
scenario where a uniform tax is levied on all goods, but where purchases in informal stores are de facto
not taxed (scenario #1 defined in Section 4). The green-cross line corresponds to a scenario where food
purchases are de jure exempt, but where formal and informal stores are taxed (scenario #2 in Section 4).
The green-square line corresponds to a tax scenario where both de facto informality exemption and de
jure food exemption are present (scenario #3 in Section 4).
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Figure 6: Progressivity over Development
(a) Formal Taxed
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(b) Non-Food Taxed
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(c) Formal Non-Food Taxed
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These panels plot the ratio of effective tax rate paid by the richest quintile relative to the poorest quintile
in each country as a function of the country’s level of economic development. The left panel corresponds
to a scenario where a uniform tax is levied on all goods, but purchases in informal stores are de facto not
taxed (scenario #1 in Section 4). The middle panel corresponds to a scenario where food goods are de jure
exempt, but purchases in both formal and informal stores are taxed (scenario #2 in Section 4). The right
panel combines de facto informality exemption and de jure food exemption (scenario #3 in Section 4). In
each panel, the ratio is plotted for all 31 countries of our sample against log GDP per capita.
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Figure 7: Optimal Rate Differentiation over Development
(a) All Varieties Taxed, No Efficiency Change
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(b) Only Formal Varieties Taxed, No Efficiency Change
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(c) All Varieties Taxed, With Efficiency Change
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(d) Only Formal Varieties Taxed, With Efficiency Change
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All panels plot for each country the ratio of the calibrated optimal rate on food products relative to the
optimal rate on non-food products, as a function of that country’s log GDP per capita. Optimal rates are
calibrated using expressions (8) (panels A and C) and (9) (panels B and D). A value equal to 1 indicates
that both optimal rates are set at the same level, a lower value indicates that it is optimal to subsidize
food products relative to non-food products. In panels A and C we assume that all varieties can be
taxed; in panels B and D, we assume that only formal varieties can be taxed. In panels A and B we hold
efficiency considerations constant by assuming that uncompensated price elasticities of demand are equal
across goods and countries, while in panels C and D we allow price elasticities to vary across goods and
countries by calibrating values using expression (4).
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Figure 8: Inequality Reduction: Optimal Policy and Current Tax Policies
Panel A shows the average percent-change in Gini for different scenarios applied to the countries of this
paper’s core sample. The red dot represents the scenario where a uniform rate is implemented but only
the formal sector is taxed. The green dot represents the scenario where only non-food items, but both
sectors are taxed. The orange dot represents the scenario where only non-food items, and only the formal
sector are taxed. The reported effects reflect the change in Gini from the pre-tax income distribution to
the post-tax distribution. Panel B show the percent-change in Gini using data from the Commitment to
Equity Institute (CEQ). In the first row of Panel B, the pre-tax income measure is disposable income, and
actual general consumption and excise taxes are applied; in the second row of Panel B, the pre-tax income
measure is market income plus direct transfers, and actual personal income taxes and compulsory social
security contributions are applied. Adding transfers to the pre-tax income measure is commonly done in
analyses of the marginal distributional effects of tax policies. Effects calculated in Panel B are based on
country and income-decile data, publicly available, and released under Lustig (2018).
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Table 1: Household Expenditure Surveys for Core Sample
Country Code Survey Year GDP per capita Sample size Nb items/HH
Benin BJ EMICOV 2015 828 19871 32
Bolivia BO ECH 2004 1658 9149 49
Brazil BR POF 2009 10595 56025 41
Burkina Faso BF EICVM 2009 563 8404 152
Burundi BI ECVM 2014 245 6681 90
Cameroon CM ECAM 2014 1400 10303 81
Chad TD ECOSIT 2003 572 6697 94
Chile CL EPF 2017 14749 15239 129
Colombia CO ENIG 2007 5999 42373 60
Comoros KM EDMC 2013 1373 3131 82
Congo DRC CD E123 2005 301 12098 107
Congo Rep CG ECOM 2005 2569 5002 85
Costa Rica CR ENIGH 2014 8994 5705 68
Dominican Rep DO ENIGH 2007 5121 8363 88
Ecuador EC ENIGHUR 2012 5122 39617 89
Eswatini SZ HIES 2010 4169 3167 44
Mexico MX ENIGH 2014 9839 19479 61
Montenegro ME HBS 2009 6516 1223 149
Morocco MA ENCDM 2001 2095 14243 90
Mozambique MZ IOF 2009 416 10832 221
Niger NE ENCBM 2007 330 4000 192
Papua NG PG HIES 2010 1949 3810 111
Peru PE ENAHO 2017 6315 43545 78
Rwanda RW EICV 2014 690 14416 54
Sao Tome ST IOF 2010 1095 3545 100
Senegal SN EDMC 2008 1278 2503 299
Serbia RS HBS 2015 6155 6531 105
South Africa ZA IES 2011 7455 25328 44
Tanzania TZ HBS 2012 788 10186 318
Tunisia TN ENBCNV 2010 4142 11281 139
Uruguay UY ENIGH 2005 9079 7043 77
This table lists alphabetically the 31 countries in the core sample, the survey names and years. GDP per
capita is in PPP USD in the year of the survey, obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators.
Code refers to the country acronym which we use in the figures. The sample size refers to the number of
households in the survey, and the number of items reported is the number of expenditure items reported
on average across all households in the survey.
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Table 2: Average Slopes of the Informality Engel Curves
Specification: Main Geography Product Codes All
Avg. of 31 Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Negative of) Slope 9.8 10.6 9.2 8.5 6.9 6.3 6.1 5.4 4.3
Confidence Interval [9.2,10.4] [9.9,11.2] [8.5,9.9] [7.7,9.2] [6.2,7.4] [5.7,6.7] [5.5,6.5] [4.8,5.7] [3.7,4.7]
# of p-values < 0.05 31 31 31 30 30 29 30 29 28
R2 adjusted 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.41 0.43 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.54
Household Characteristics X X X X X X X X
Urban/Rural X
Survey Blocks X X
Food Products X
COICOP 2-dig X
COICOP 3-dig X
COICOP 4-dig X X
This table shows the (negative) average slope of the Informality Engel Curves across countries for dif-
ferent specifications. In column 1, we report the slopes that are estimated from the following regression:
Share In f ormalip = b0 + b1ln(expenditurei) + #ip where Share In f ormalip is the share of household i’s
informal expenditure on product p. We weigh each observation using household survey weights and
the expenditure share of the product. Average of lower and upper bound of 95% confidence intervals
in brackets, from robust standard errors. In column 2, we augment this regression with controls for
household characteristics (household size, age, gender, education of head). In column 3 (4), we instead
add fixed effects for urban/rural (survey enumeration blocks). In column 5, we instead add fixed effects
for food versus non-food products. In column 6/7/8, we instead add fixed effects for product codes at
2nd/3rd/4th level of the COICOP classification. In column 9, we add household characteristics, as well as
fixed effects for survey blocks and COICOP-4.
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Table 3: Main Reason for Choosing Place of Purchase
Outcome: Share of purchases (in %)
Reason All Stores Informal Stores Formal Stores
Access 41.5 42.1 31.3
Price 28.6 29.4 17.7
Quality 13.4 11.8 40.6
Store Attributes 6.9 6.9 5.0
Other 9.6 9.8 5.5
The table reports for each potential reason households report for using a particular place of purchase,
the share of purchases associated with this reason. Each number is an average across the six countries in
our core sample in which the household survey asks this questions. These countries are Benin, Burundi,
Comoros, Congo Rep., Morocco and RD Congo. In all surveys seven reasons are listed which we classify
into five categories as follows: access is defined as ”The retailer is closer or more convenient” and ”The
good or service cannot be found elsewhere”, price as ”The good or services are cheaper”, quality as ”The
goods or services are of better quality”, store attributes as ”The retailer offers credit” and ”The retailer is
welcoming or is a friend” and other as ”Others reasons”. Note that Morocco has a few additional small
categories, which pertain to attributes of retailer. The table lists the frequency for all purchases of goods
and excludes services, which are less comparable along these dimensions, although their inclusion does
not impact the results.
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Table 4: Baseline Calibration Parameters
Parameter Value Justification
Budget shares sij and s
i
j1 Varying Observed in our data
Household income (scaled) fi Varying Observed in our data
Income elasticities of goods hj Food: 0.65, From our data, using hj = 1+
b j
sj
1
Non-food: 1.2
Income elasticities of formal varieties hj1 Food: 1.14, From our data, using hj1 = 1+
b j1
sj1
1
Non-food: 1.31,
All goods: 1.25
Informal share of consumption aj Varying From our data
Cross-variety compensated elasticity e˜C 1.5 Faber and Fally (2017); Atkin et al. (2018b)2
Own-price compensated elasticity eC -0.7 Deaton et al. (1994)3
Government preferences gi 1-10 Uniform tax rates in the [0.10, 0.25] range4
1 The parameter b j (b j1) refers to the estimated slope of the Engel curve for good j (variety j1).
2 For the cross-variety price elasticity we use estimates of the elasticity of substitution s across store types
in consumption obtained by Faber and Fally (2017); Atkin et al. (2018b) which are in the [2, 4] range. With
a CES utility function e˜C = ss0 where s0 is the aggregate budget share spent in the informal sector, equal
to 0.5 on average in our sample.
3 Our choice of value for eC together with our estimated income elasticities and observed budget shares
yield uncompensated own-price elasticities for goods in the [ 2, 0.5] range, in line with estimates obtained
by Deaton et al. (1994) in the developing country context.
4 We set gi = 10 for the first decile, gi = 9 for the second decile, gi = 8 for the third decile, ..., gi = 1 for
the tenth decile. This, together with our other calibration choices, yields optimal uniform rates when we
assume only formal varieties can be taxed in the 10-25% range, in line with observed consumption tax rates
in developing countries.
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Figure A1: Informality Engel Curves
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(ae) Uruguay
Local polynomial fit of the Informality Engel Curves in all 31 core sample countries. Per person total
expenditure on the horizontal axis is measured in log. Informal budget share is on the vertical axis. The
shaded area around the polynomial fit corresponds to the 95% confidence interval. The solid grey line
corresponds to the median of each country’s expenditure distribution, while the dotted lines correspond to
the 5th and 95th percentiles. The construction of informality Engel curves is presented in section 3.1.
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Figure A2: Alternative Assignment Scenarios for Informal Expenditure
(a) Budget Shares (Probability Scenario)
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(b) Slopes (Probability Scenario)
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(c) Budget Shares (Robustness Scenario)
BJ
BO BR
BF
BI
CM
TD
CL
CO
KM
CD
CG
CRDO
EC
SZ
MX
ME
MA
MZ
NE
PG
PE
RW ST
SN
RS
ZA
TZ
TN
UY
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
In
fo
rm
al
 C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
S
ha
re
5 6 7 8 9 10
Log GDP per capita, Constant 2010 USD
(d) Slopes (Robustness Scenario)
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This figure is the equivalent of figure 3 for the two alternative assignments of store types to formality. The
Probability scenario uses the observed probability of VAT payment by store type in the Mexican census as
the formality probability of each store type across countries (see Figure 1). The robustness scenario differs
from the central scenario by assigning specialized stores to the informal sector, in addition to maintaining
corner stores, non brick and mortar and self-production in the informal sector. Panel (a) and (c) show
informal budget shares, on log per capita GDP. Panel (b) and (d) show the the slope of informality Engel
curves on log per capita GDP. The bars correspond to the 95% confidence interval of the slope coefficient.
GDP per capita is in constant 2010 USD (Source: World Bank WDI).
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Figure A3: Unspecified Places of Purchase by Good
(a) Percentage of Total Expenditure
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(b) Percentage of Goods’ Expenditure
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This figure shows the share of expenditures with an unspecified place of purchase by goods categories
(COICOP-2 digit level) on average, across the 31 countries of the core sample, discussed in section 2.2.
Panel (a) shows this share as a percentage of total expenditures and Panel (b) as a percentage of each
goods’ total expenditure.
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Figure A4: Average Expenditure of Each Decile by Place of Purchase
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This figure shows the average expenditure of each decile across countries by type of retailer, following the
retailer taxonomy described in section 2.2. Panel (a), (b), (c), (d) show the places of purchase classified
as informal and Panel (e), (f), (g) and (h) show the places of purchase classified as formal in the central
scenario of the paper.
Figure A5: Average Expenditure of Each Decile By Formality Assignment
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(b) Formal Places of Purchase
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This figure shows the average expenditure of each decile across countries by type of retailer, following the
retailer taxonomy described in section 2.2. Panel (a) shows the places of purchase classified as informal and
Panel (b) shows the places of purchase classified as formal in the central scenario of the paper.
55
Figure A6: Informality Engel Curve Slopes Controlling for Geography
(a) Control: Rural Location
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(b) Control: Survey Block
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This figure shows each countries Informality Engel curves’ on their GDP per capita, when controlling for
geographical variables. Panel (a) controls for a rural/urban dummy variable and panel (b) controls for
survey enumeration blocks.
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Figure A7: Rural vs Urban Informal Consumption
(a) Rural: Budget Share
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(b) Urban: Budget Share
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(c) Rural: IEC slope
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(d) Urban: IEC slope
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This figure plots informality levels and the slopes of the informality Engel curves for households located
in rural regions (graphs a and c) and urban regions (graphs b and d). It only contains 29 countries instead
of 31, since the expenditure surveys in Chile and Senegal concern urban population only.
Figure A8: Informality Engel Curve Slopes Controlling for Goods Composition
(a) Control: Food Products
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(b) Control: COICOP2
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(c) Control: COICOP3
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(d) Control: COICOP4
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This figure shows the informality Engel curves’ slopes across countries when controlling for increasingly
narrow products (and household controls). Panel (a) only controls for food products, panel (b) controls for
the 12 COICOP2 good categories, panel (c) controls for the 47 COICOP3 categories and panel (d) controls
for the 117 COICOP4 categories.
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Figure A9: Share of Purchases where Store is Chosen for its Quality by Income
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(d) Dem. Rep. of Congo
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(f) Rep. of Congo
Local polynomial fit of the share of households buying any product for its quality on household’s total
expenditure per person (log). Each panel corresponds to one of the six countries, for which the expenditure
survey asks respondents why they chose this place of purchase for each expenditure. The solid vertical line
corresponds to the median household total expenditure, while the dotted lines correspond to the 5th and
95th percentile.
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Figure A10: Budget Shares
(a) Informal Food
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(b) Formal Food
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(c) Informal Non-Food
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(d) Formal Non-Food
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Panel (a) shows country informal food consumption as a share of total consumption, plotted against log
per capita GDP. Panel (b), (c) and (d) are constructed similarly to Panel (a), respectively showing formal
food consumption, informal non-food consumption and formal non-food consumption.
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Figure A11: Engel Curve Slopes
(a) Informal Food
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(b) Formal Food
BFBI BJ BO
BR
CD CG
CL
CM
CO
CRDO
ECKM
MA ME
MX
MZ
NE PE
PG
RS
RW SNST
SZ
TD
TNTZ
UY
ZA
−
2
0
−
1
5
−
1
0
−
5
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
F
o
rm
a
l F
o
o
d
 E
n
g
e
l C
u
rv
e
 S
lo
p
e
5 6 7 8 9 10
Log GDP per capita, Constant 2010 USD
(c) Informal Non-Food
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(d) Formal Non-Food
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Panel (a) shows the country-specific slope of informal food consumption with respect to log household
expenditure, plotted against log per capita GDP. The slope measures the drop in informal food consump-
tion for a doubling of households’ income. Panel (b), (c) and (d) are constructed similarly to Panel (a),
respectively showing formal food consumption, informal non-food consumption and formal non-food con-
sumption.
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Figure A12: Share of Informal Consumption for Food and Non Food Goods
(a) Informal Food
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(b) Informal Non-Food
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Panel (a) shows the share of food consumption which occurs in the informal sector. Panel (b) shows the
share of non food consumption which occurs in the informal sector. For each good, this is constructed by
taking total informal consumption of the good and dividing it by the total consumption of that good.
62
Figure A13: Optimal Uniform Tax on Formal Varieties
(a) No efficiency consideration
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(b) Cross price elasticity = 1.5
BF
BI
BJ
BO
BR
CD
CG
CL
CM
CO CR
DOEC
KM
MA
ME
MX
MZ
NE
PE
PG
RS
RW
SNST
SZ
TD TN
TZ
UY
ZA
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
O
pt
im
al
 U
ni
fo
rm
 R
at
e
5 6 7 8 9 10
Log GDP per capita, Constant 2010 USD
(c) Cross price elasticity = 1
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(d) Cross price elasticity = 2
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The panels plot the optimal uniform rate for each country calibrated using expression (6) as a function of
each country’s log GDP per capita. In panel (a) we hold efficiency considerations constant by assuming
that uncompensated elasticities of demand are equal across all countries, in panels (b), (c) and (d) we allow
price elasticities to vary across goods and countries by calibrating values using expression (4) above. We
vary the value of the cross-variety compensated elasticity e˜C across the three panels: it is 1.5 (our baseline
value) in panel (b), 1 in panel (c) and 2 in panel (d).
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Figure A14: Optimal Rate Differentiation: Robustness
(a) Only Formal Varieties Taxed, Cross price elasticity = 1.5
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(b) Only Formal Varieties Taxed, Cross price elasticity = 1
BF
BI
BJ
BO
BR
CD
CG
CL
CM
CO
CR
DO
EC
KM
MA
ME
MXMZ
NE PE
PG
RS
RW
SNST SZ
TD
TNTZ
UY
ZA
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
R
at
io
 F
oo
d 
R
at
e 
/ N
on
 F
oo
d 
R
at
e
5 6 7 8 9 10
Log GDP per capita, Constant 2010 USD 
(c) Only Formal Varieties Taxed, Cross price elasticity = 2
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The panels plot for each country the ratio of the calibrated optimal rate on food products relative to the
optimal rate on non-food products, as a function of that country’s log GDP per capita. Optimal rates are
calibrated using expression (9). A value equal to 1 indicates that both optimal rates are set at the same
level, a lower value indicates that it is optimal to subsidize food products relative to non-food products. In
all panels we assume only formal varieties can be taxed and allow price elasticities to vary across goods
and countries by calibrating values using expression (4) above. We vary the value of the cross-variety
compensated elasticity e˜C across the three panels: it is 1.5 (our baseline value) in panel (a), 1 in panel (b)
and 2 in panel (c).
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Figure A15: Change in Gini by Income Groups
This figure shows the average percent change in the Gini coefficient per different group of countries for
the three scenarios. Panel A shows the drop in Gini for lower income countries (i.e. the countries with
a GDP per capita inferior to 2100 $ in constant US 2010.) of this paper core sample. Panel B shows the
drop in Gini for middle income countries (i.e. the countries with a GDP per capita superior to 2100 $ in
constant US 2010.) of this paper core sample. For Panel A and B the red dot represents the scenario where
a uniform rate is implemented but only the formal sector is taxed. The green dot represents the scenario
where only non-food items, but both sectors are taxed. The orange dot represents the scenario where only
non-food items, and only the formal sector are taxed.Panel C show the drop in Gini using data from the
Commitment to Equity Institute (CEQ). This sample gathers both lower and middle income countries.
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Table A1: IEC Slopes by Country
Country Main Geography Product Codes All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Benin 3.31 3.61 3.18 4.54 0.92 1.49 1.36 1.03 1.26
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15)
Bolivia 9.77 11.43 8.99 7.22 5.71 4.87 5.13 2.93 2.74
(0.29) (0.33) (0.38) (0.44) (0.29) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.25)
Brazil 7.60 7.98 7.07 6.41 7.50 7.15 7.79 8.11 6.64
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14)
Burkina Faso 9.71 10.56 7.58 6.89 7.97 5.20 4.92 3.73 2.39
(0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.28) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19)
Burundi 1.89 2.35 1.44 0.80 0.83 1.54 1.20 0.84 0.33
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Cameroon 8.21 9.35 7.13 5.81 5.72 4.30 4.61 4.55 2.88
(0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.22) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13)
Chad 5.72 6.21 4.54 3.10 3.35 2.37 2.29 2.23 0.90
(0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.37) (0.25) (0.19) (0.16) (0.15) (0.22)
Chile 0.97 0.91 0.91 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.21) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)
Colombia 9.76 10.52 10.56 8.32 5.31 6.51 4.28 3.22 3.37
(0.23) (0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.17) (0.19)
Comoros 9.54 11.65 11.08 8.84 7.28 6.95 6.16 5.93 4.42
(0.58) (0.71) (0.74) (0.82) (0.58) (0.47) (0.42) (0.37) (0.56)
CongoDRC 2.04 2.76 1.62 2.66 2.34 2.36 2.17 1.99 1.51
(0.15) (0.17) (0.14) (0.20) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.16)
Congo Rep 4.21 5.62 4.13 7.06 4.22 4.01 3.96 2.97 2.78
(0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.43) (0.27) (0.22) (0.18) (0.16) (0.25)
Costa Rica 7.22 8.60 7.72 5.95 7.25 8.44 10.60 10.69 8.84
(0.35) (0.37) (0.38) (0.45) (0.35) (0.33) (0.30) (0.25) (0.30)
Dominican Rep 14.39 14.89 14.48 11.78 5.70 4.76 4.57 3.52 2.36
(0.31) (0.35) (0.35) (0.42) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.23) (0.25)
Ecuador 19.11 20.90 19.11 16.57 13.02 12.22 11.92 12.34 9.46
(0.18) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
Eswatini 11.64 12.38 11.55 12.56 10.17 10.47 10.89 10.05 9.88
(0.51) (0.62) (0.67) (0.65) (0.55) (0.51) (0.54) (0.50) (0.51)
Mexico 12.01 13.57 11.51 9.83 9.14 9.33 9.70 10.39 7.09
(0.20) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.16) (0.19)
Montenegro 18.16 18.88 16.04 16.60 14.61 15.83 15.91 14.23 12.52
(0.84) (0.94) (0.97) (1.11) (0.79) (0.68) (0.67) (0.53) (0.59)
Morocco 16.85 18.11 14.05 12.09 12.35 10.57 4.34 2.14 0.00
(0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.27) (0.19) (0.18) (0.21) (0.25) (0.28)
Mozambique 9.67 11.28 8.83 9.30 9.43 6.59 5.23 3.66 2.74
(0.37) (0.39) (0.40) (0.44) (0.33) (0.29) (0.27) (0.23) (0.29)
Niger 3.90 4.66 3.68 4.29 2.62 0.25 0.34 0.20 0.61
(0.34) (0.37) (0.41) (0.40) (0.31) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.26)
Papua New Guinea 8.59 9.35 7.14 7.36 8.10 6.88 6.40 4.24 3.06
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.52) (0.43) (0.40) (0.38) (0.30) (0.32)
Peru 18.04 18.92 16.04 12.59 9.31 9.26 9.41 7.89 4.15
(0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (0.27) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.16)
Rwanda 9.90 10.61 8.68 9.75 9.04 5.23 2.14 0.97 0.09
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.25) (0.18) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Sao Tome 4.66 5.23 5.26 5.06 3.50 2.64 2.46 1.84 1.84
(0.48) (0.56) (0.57) (0.58) (0.48) (0.44) (0.43) (0.37) (0.38)
Senegal 15.20 12.19 12.19 11.56 6.57 7.39 5.53 4.83 4.47
(0.67) (0.74) (0.74) (0.84) (0.63) (0.59) (0.57) (0.56) (0.65)
Serbia 20.91 24.24 22.74 23.03 13.67 10.48 9.50 9.48 8.47
(0.58) (0.58) (0.56) (0.56) (0.51) (0.49) (0.47) (0.29) (0.29)
South Africa 7.50 8.69 7.78 7.29 6.78 6.49 7.69 7.59 6.92
(0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11)
Tanzania 8.47 7.52 7.26 4.88 3.18 1.03 1.11 2.11 0.80
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.27) (0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15)
Tunisia 13.68 12.98 10.72 9.05 10.18 12.97 17.60 14.57 13.03
(0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) (0.26) (0.29)
Uruguay 11.57 11.73 11.65 10.87 8.18 8.48 8.96 9.31 8.36
(0.25) (0.27) (0.28) (0.32) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.21)
All Countries (Mean) 9.8 10.6 9.2 8.5 6.9 6.3 6.1 5.4 4.3
Household Characteristics X X X X X X X X
Urban/Rural X
Survey Blocks X X
Food Products X X
COICOP 2-dig X
COICOP 3-dig X
COICOP 4-dig X X
This table shows the average slope of the Informal Engel curve across countries for different specifications. The slopes are
estimated from: Share In f ormali = b.ln(expenditure pc)i + GXi + #i, where the dependent variable is the informal expenditure
share and the explanatory variable is the log expenditure pp. Controls include household characteristics (household size, age,
gender, and education of head), geographic indicators (urban/rural and survey enumeration blocks), and product codes for food
compared to the rest and at the 2nd, 3rd and 4th level of the United Nation’s COICOP classification.
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Table A2: IEC Slopes: Probabilistic Formality Assignment
Specification: Main Geography Product Codes All
Avg. of 31 Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Slope 7.8 8.3 7.1 6.4 5.0 4.5 4.4 3.8 3.0
Confidence Interval [ 7.3,8.4 ] [ 7.7,8.9] [ 6.4,7.7] [ 5.7,7.1] [ 4.4,5.5] [ 4.0,4.9] [ 3.9,4.7] [ 3.4,4.1] [ 2.4,3.3]
# of p-values < 0.05 30 30 30 30 30 29 29 30 26
R2 adjusted 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.39 0.42 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.58
Household Characteristics X X X X X X X X
Urban/Rural X
Survey Blocks X X
Food Products X
COICOP 2-dig X
COICOP 3-dig X
COICOP 4-dig X X
This table shows the average slope of the Informal Engel curve across countries for different speci-
fications under the probabilsitic assignment of places of purchase to formality. The Probabilistic sce-
nario uses the observed probability of VAT registration by store type in the Mexican census as the
formality probability of each store across countries (see Figure 1). The slopes are estimated from:
Share In f ormali = b.ln(expenditure pc)i + GXi + #i. The dependent variable is informal expenditure share
and the main explanatory variable is log expenditure per capita. Controls include household characteris-
tics (household size, age, gender, education of head), location indicators (urban/rural, survey enumeration
blocks), and product codes for food vs all other purchases, 2nd, 3rd and 4th level of the COICOP classifi-
cation.
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Table A3: IEC Slopes: Robustness Formality Assignment
Specification: Main Geography Product Codes All
Avg. of 31 Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Slope 7.0 7.4 6.3 5.8 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.3 2.7
Confidence Interval [6.4,7.6] [6.7,8.1] [5.6,7.0] [4.8,6.4] [3.5,4.7] [3.1,4.1] [3.1,4.1] [2.7,3.5] [2.0,3.0]
# of p-values < 0.05 30 30 29 28 28 28 27 25 25
R2 adjusted 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.34 0.38 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.57
Household Characteristics X X X X X X X X
Urban/Rural X
Survey Blocks X X
Food Products X
COICOP 2-dig X
COICOP 3-dig X
COICOP 4-dig X X
This table shows the average slope of the Informal Engel curve across countries for different specifi-
cations under the robustness scenario assignment of places of purchase to formality. The robustness
scenario differs from the central scenario by assigning specialized stores to the informal sector, in addi-
tion to maintaining corner stores, non brick and mortar and self-production in the informal sector. The
slopes are estimated from: Share In f ormali = b.ln(expenditure pc)i + GXi + #i. The dependent variable
is informal expenditure share and the main explanatory variable is log expenditure per capita. Controls
include household characteristics (household size, age, gender, education of head), location indicators (ur-
ban/rural, survey enumeration blocks), and product codes for food vs all other purchases, 2nd, 3rd and
4th level of the COICOP classification.
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Table A4: Main Reason for Choosing Place of Purchase
Outcome: Share of purchases (in %)
Benin Burundi Comoros
Reason All Stores Informal Formal All Stores Informal Formal All Stores Informal Formal
Access 39.0 39.3 29.9 49.8 49.9 41.5 36.2 38.6 16.4
Price 26.4 26.8 11.6 27.6 27.8 14.8 31.1 31.7 26.1
Quality 24.3 23.5 51.4 6.4 5.7 41.0 12.4 9.0 39.8
Store Attributes 7.4 7.6 3.3 3.7 3.8 0.8 13.4 14.3 6.0
Other 2.9 2.9 3.9 12.6 12.8 1.9 7.0 6.4 11.7
Dem. Rep of Congo Morocco Rep. of Congo
Reason All Stores Informal Formal All Stores Informal Formal All Stores Informal Formal
Access 28.7 28.9 16.1 58.5 58.7 57.3 36.8 37.5 26.8
Price 34.3 34.4 27.2 20.1 22.5 6.4 32.4 33.3 20.0
Quality 16.6 16.3 46.5 6.3 3.9 19.7 14.3 12.2 45.0
Store Attributes 7.8 7.8 7.6 1.7 0.6 7.7 7.2 7.4 4.3
Other 12.6 12.7 2.7 13.5 14.3 8.9 9.3 9.7 3.8
The table reports the frequencies across all purchases by reason of choosing a place of purchase, and shows
the average for the six countries in the core sample which ask this question. These countries are Benin,
Burundi, Comoros, Congo Rep., Morocco and RD Congo. In all surveys seven reasons are listed which we
classify into five categories as follows: access is defined as ”The retailer is closer or more convenient” and
”The good or service cannot be found elsewhere”, price as ”The good or services are cheaper”, quality
as ”The goods or services are of better quality”, store attributes as ”The retailer offers credit” and ”The
retailer is welcoming or is a friend” and other as ”Others reasons”. Note that Morocco has a few additional
small categories, which pertain to attributes of retailer. The table lists the frequency for all purchases of
goods and excludes services, which are less comparable along these dimensions, although their inclusion
does not impact the results.
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Table A5: Unit Values Across Places of Purchase
Outcome: % dif. in formal sector unit values # Purchases # FE
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benin 5.25 1.10 3.38 -0.39 262,280 5,065
(7.10) (5.66) (7.53) (6.19)
Bolivia 4.08 3.53 4.69 3.86 120,971 1,549
(1.40) (1.12) (1.40) (1.15)
Brazil -0.11 -0.20 0.14 0.01 704,639 9,437
(0.37) (0.35) (0.38) (0.35)
Burundi 2.53 4.39 4.81 5.23 250,139 2,454
(4.65) (4.73) (4.39) (4.23)
Chad -4.36 -3.21 -4.36 -3.21 380,462 1,968
(1.80) (1.77) (1.80) (1.77)
Colombia -0.33 -0.04 -0.30 -0.06 778,203 7,861
(0.55) (0.30) (0.55) (0.30)
Comoros 22.56 14.93 21.81 14.49 113,228 1,142
(5.01) (3.64) (4.98) (3.64)
CongoDRC 4.62 0.87 9.77 5.89 865,754 5,556
(16.79) (12.88) (17.47) (14.15)
Congo Rep 27.84 23.70 27.12 23.01 208,557 1,182
(5.88) (4.67) (6.03) (4.78)
Costa Rica 3.04 2.37 1.93 1.58 122,467 1,593
(2.40) (2.11) (2.17) (1.93)
Dominican Rep 18.86 13.64 18.94 13.73 340,303 4,416
(1.69) (1.01) (1.68) (1.00)
Ecuador 2.29 1.86 2.23 1.82 1,030,387 12,104
(0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.62)
Eswatini 3.09 2.38 1.31 1.06 89,209 852
(2.10) (1.79) (1.89) (1.46)
Mexico 1.10 1.00 1.10 1.00 446,417 6,195
(1.16) (1.02) (1.16) (1.02)
Montenegro 10.36 9.57 7.13 6.45 138,446 867
(3.70) (3.25) (3.08) (2.85)
Morocco 7.10 5.43 6.88 5.22 743,979 3,598
(0.87) (0.70) (0.92) (0.75)
Peru 14.70 13.29 14.69 13.29 1,300,408 10,721
(2.74) (2.46) (2.74) (2.46)
Sao Tome 6.81 4.87 6.69 4.86 215,527 2,946
(1.39) (1.37) (1.39) (1.34)
Serbia 2.39 2.03 2.86 2.49 503,344 9,332
(0.49) (0.46) (0.51) (0.48)
Tanzania 2.11 1.59 2.80 2.21 1,169,193 13,771
(0.73) (0.68) (0.59) (0.55)
Avg. of 20 Countries 6.70 5.16 6.68 5.13
Confidence Interval [0.7,12.7] [0.2,10.1] [0.7,12.7] [0.1,10.1]
# of p-values < 0.05 12 12 11 11
Winsorization [5,95] X X
Self Consumption X X
This table shows the percentage difference in unit values in the formal sector compared to the informal
sector. The sample is restricted to food purchases, for which units and unit values are detailed, in the 20
core sample countries with such data. Formally it runs the following specification: ln(unit value)ipmu =
b Formalipmu + µpmu + eipmu, where ln(unit value)ipmu is the unit value reported by household i, for
product p, in location m, in units u, and Formalipmu equals one if the product is purchased in a formal
store. We add fixed effects at the product * location * unit of measurement. Standard errors are clustered
at the location level.
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Table A6: Ratio Top over Bottom Quintile of Effective Tax Rates
Baseline Baseline + Baseline + Distri- Probabilistic Robust
Tax policy Assignment VAT on Input butional Savings Assignment Assignment
Uniform rate, only formal taxed 2.06 1.62 1.89 1.76 1.95
Food exempt, formal and informal taxed 1.67 1.67 1.54 1.63 1.67
Food exempt, only formal taxed 2.36 2.18 2.17 2.11 2.19
This table shows the progressivity of consumption tax policies, measured as the effective tax rate of the
richest household quintile over that of the poorest quintile. The numbers are averages for the 31 countries
in the core sample. The rows correspond to the three tax policies considered: (1) a uniform rate on all
goods in a context where only formal goods can be taxed, (2) a tax exemption on food in a context where
both formal and informal goods can be taxed, and (3) an exemption on food, in a context where only
formal goods can be taxed. The columns correspond to the different assumptions on our data. Column (1)
corresponds to the central informality assignment of retailers. Column (2) models a 10% pass-through of
taxes onto prices in the informal sector, following the share of formal inputs in informal firms in Mexico’s
census. Column (3) allows for savings rate, which increases linearly from 0 for the bottom decile to 15% for
the top decile, following evidence form consumer finance surveys. Columns (4) and (5) use the alternative
assignment of store types to formality, by using either the probability of formality by store type from
Mexico’s census, or by assigning specialized stores to the informal sector instead of the formal sector.
Table A7: Percent Change in Gini from Optimal Tax Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Baseline + Baseline + Distri- Probabilistic Robust Cross-variety
Assignment VAT on Input butional Savings Assignment Assignment Elasticity
Tax policy e˜C = 1 e˜C = 2
Uniform rate, only formal taxed -2.30 -2.02 -1.24 -1.71 -1.54 -2.82 -1.95
Food rate differentiation, formal & informal taxed -3.16 -3.16 -0.96 -3.16 -3.16 -3.16 -3.16
Food rate differentiation, only formal taxed -3.26 -3.11 -1.88 -2.42 -2.03 -3.84 -2.85
Full rate differentiation, formal & informal taxed (12 goods) -4.81 -4.81 -2.40 -4.60 -4.81 -4.81 -4.81
Full rate differentiation, only formal taxed (12 goods) -4.19 -4.01 -3.11 -3.22 -2.83 -4.73 -3.82
This table shows the redistributive impact of different consumption tax policies under different hypothe-
sis, as presented in section 6. Our metric for redistribution is the percent change in Gini from the pre-tax
income distribution to the net-of-tax distribution. We take the average across the 31 countries in the core
sample. The rows correspond to the tax policy scenarios considered. (1) a uniform rate on all goods in a
context where only formal goods can be taxed, (2) optimal tax rates on food and non food goods in a con-
text where both formal and informal goods can be taxed, (3) optimal tax rates on food and non food goods,
in a context where only formal goods can be taxed, (4) optimal tax rates for each of the 12 COICOP-2 digit
level goods in a context where both formal and informal goods can be taxed, and (5) optimal tax rates
for each of the 12 COICOP-2 digit level goods in a context where only formal goods can be taxed. The
columns correspond to the different assumptions on our data. The baseline in column (1) corresponds to
the central assignment of retailers to informality status, and to a value of the cross-variety elasticity of 1.5.
Column (2) adds to the baseline scenario a 10% pass-through of taxes onto prices in the informal sector,
following the share of formal inputs in informal firms in Mexico’s census. Column (3) adds the baseline
scenario a distributional savings rate which ranges from 0 for the bottom decile to 15% for the top decile,
following evidence form consumer finance surveys. Columns (4) and (5) use the alternative assignment of
store types to formality. Finally columns (6) and (7) keep the central store assignment to informality but
vary the value of the elasticity of substitution between the formal and informal variety of goods.
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B Data Appendix
All statistical codes to replicate the paper are available at https://github.com/
pierrebachas/Informality_Taxes_Redistribution. This includes the cleaning
files for the micro data of each country’s survey, as well as all files generating the tables
and figures of the paper.
B.1 Core Sample
Inclusion Criteria
Our dataset consists of 31 nationally representative household expenditure surveys. We
use surveys which satisfy the following four criteria:
1. The household expenditure survey is nationally representative and dates from the
21st century.
2. The expenditure module(s) in the survey is structured as an open consumption
diary, rather than a pre-fill diaries for a limited set of products.
3. The expenditure survey includes a variable for the place of purchase (data on where
each item was purchased). The place of purchases are detailed enough for us to
apply our taxonomy of store types, as further outlined in section B.2.
4. The place of purchase variable rarely contains missing values, particularly for food,
clothing and household goods product categories (see Figure A3).
Data Sources and Coverage
We obtained the data principally from two sources: (i) the World Bank Microdata Li-
brary and (ii) National Statistical Agencies. Our first step for accessing data was to
search the restricted-access World Bank Microdata Library for household Income and
Expenditure, Living Standards, and Budget Surveys to see in which countries criteria
(1)-(4) above appeared to be satisfied. The datasets which satisfied these criteria varied
in their ease of access: for some countries, the micro data were accessible for download
on the World Bank platform, others were licensed and required applications through the
World Bank, which would in turn sometimes contact the country’s national statistical
agency for approval. If a survey was listed without its micro through the World Bank
platform, we reached directly the country’s’ statistical agency. Most countries for which
we requested the data sent us the micro data, but in a few cases we could not obtain data
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which included the place of purchase variables. The countries which ultimately satisfied
the criteria for inclusion span four regions of the world, concentrated in Sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, as detailed in Table B1. Unfortunately we
were not able to include countries in Asia, since the question on the place of purchase
was almost always missing from their budget surveys.
Table B1: Regional Survey Representation
Region # Countries Pop. of Surveyed Countries Total Pop. Proportion of pop.
(Millions) (Millions)
Sub-Saharan Africa 16 379 1078 35%
Middle East & North Africa 2 48 449 11%
Europe & Central Asia 2 9 918 1%
Latin America & Carribean 10 489 641 76%
East Asia & Pacific 1 9 2328 0.4%
While some surveys appeared from their questionnaire to satisfy our criteria, we ul-
timately could not include them, either because of issues with data access, or because
when we looked more closely at the data one of our criteria was violated. For complete-
ness, Table B2 further details countries that were considered, but could not be included/
Table B2: Discarded Household Expenditure Surveys
Country Survey Year Reason not Included
Armenia Integrated Living Conditions Survey 2016 PoP often missing
Bosnia & Herzegovina Household Budget Survey 2007 PoP asked as a purchasing habit
El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propositos Multiples 2010 PoP often missing; limited product categories
The Gambia Integrated Household Survey 2003 No Data access to PoP
Gerogia Integrated Household Survey 2018 Limited product categories
Ghana Living Standards Survey 2006 No Data access to PoP
Guatemala Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones de Vida 2000 PoP often missing; limited product categories
Mauritius Household Budget Survey 2012 PoP asked as a purchasing habit
Namibia Namibia Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2015 limited product categories
Nicaragua Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medicion de Nivel 2014 PoP asked as a purchasing habit; limited product categories
Tajikistan Household Budget Survey 2016 limited product categories
Turkey Household Income and Consumption Survey 2009 No Data access to PoP
Table B3 lists the 31 countries which we could include, with summary statistics and
the structure of each survey. Any slight deviation from our inclusion criteria is outlined
in the last column.
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Table B3: Household Expenditure Surveys
Country name Survey Year Source # HH # items/HH Exp/HH Urban HH Size # PoP # Modules Product Code Comments
Cst. 2010 USD
Benin EMICOV 2015 World Bank 19872 31.9 261 48.2% 4.3 12 22 COICOP
Bolivia ECH 2004 Stat. Office 9149 49.4 585 60.7% 4.2 24 3 COICOP
Brazil POF 2009 Stat. Office 56049 48 3892 84.4% 3.3 33 8 Country-specific
Burkina Faso EICVM 2009 Stat. Office 8404 161.6 563 29.3% 6.7 45 1 COICOP
Burundi ECVM 2014 World Bank 6681 90.2 242 9.0% 4.8 13 23 COICOP
Cameroon ECAM 2014 World Bank 10303 95.8 1889 44.5% 4.6 17 1 COICOP
Chad ECOSIT 2003 World Bank 6747 92 356 10.9% 5.9 17 18 Country-specific
Chile EPF 2017 Stat. Office 15237 129.2 6872 100.0% 3.3 22 1 COICOP No self-production, Only urban
Colombia ENIG 2007 Stat. Office 42733 79.6 1850 82.4% 3.8 24 5 COICOP
Comoros EDMC 2013 Stat. Office 3139 83.5 1809 49.1% 5 12 19 COICOP
Congo DRC E123 2005 World Bank 12098 106.9 198 16.0% 5.3 13 1 COICOP
Congo Rep ECOM 2005 World Bank 5002 84.8 641 63.8% 5.1 17 1 COICOP
Costa Rica ENIGH 2014 Stat. Office 5705 67.5 5256 73.2% 3.4 41 1 COICOP
Dominican Rep ENIGH 2007 Stat. Office 8363 89.1 2396 67.6% 3.7 88 3 COICOP
Ecuador ENIGHUR 2012 World Bank 39617 88.6 1923 68.0% 3.9 75 7 COICOP
Eswatini HIES 2010 World Bank 3167 43.9 1283 37.4% 4.5 13 2 COICOP
Mexico ENIGH 2014 Stat. Office 19459 57.4 2272 64.5% 3.8 19 1 COICOP
Montenegro HBS 2009 World Bank 1223 148.9 3731 62.7% 3 7 3 COICOP Cant separate categories 3 & 4
Morocco ENCDM 2001 World Bank 14243 87.5 1679 61.6% 5.9 47 17 COICOP
Mozambique IOF 2009 World Bank 10809 48.7 363 28.9% 4.7 6 6 COICOP
Niger ENCBM 2007 World Bank 4000 221.2 325 17.2% 6.4 15 6 COICOP
Papua NG HIES 2010 World Bank 3811 111.2 1002 11.3% 5.1 6 1 COICOP
Peru ENAHO 2017 Stat. Office 43545 78.5 2609 76.8% 3.9 41 8 Country-specific
Rwanda EICV 2014 World Bank 14419 53.6 417 17.1% 4.6 11 8 COICOP Pre-filled items
SaoTome IOF 2010 World Bank 3145 105.9 705 68.1% 3.8 21 3 COICOP
Senegal EDMC 2008 World Bank 1443 517.8 640 100.0% 7.7 41 1 COICOP Only urban
Serbia HBS 2015 World Bank 6531 106 1888 61.9% 2.8 9 2 COICOP
South Africa IES 2011 U. of Cape Town 25325 44.2 3557 67.3% 3.8 6 1 COICOP Cant separate categories 3 & 4
Tanzania HBS 2012 World Bank 10186 317.8 478 21.9% 5 13 2 COICOP Cant separate categories 3 & 4
Tunisia ENBCNV 2010 Stat. Office 11281 139.1 1732 67.6% 4.3 9 1 COICOP Cant separate categories 3 & 4
Uruguay ENIGH 2005 Stat. Office 7042 77.5 2855 84.9% 3 39 1 COICOP
The column ’# PoP’ refers to the number of different places of purchase in the country classification.
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Consumption Module Structure
Expenditure surveys do not have a fully homogeneous structure across countries. Table
B3 presents information on their structure and we provide a summary below:
• Number and frequency of modules
The number of consumption modules ranges from 1 to 17 across countries in the
sample. All surveys have a module which is a diary of consumption over some
short to medium period of time and some countries complement these with recall
modules for more infrequent purchases. For example, Costa Rica has a single con-
sumption module, while Morocco has 17, with modules specialized by frequency
and products. Surveys with multiple modules typically asked for consumption
linked to the frequency of expenditures (e.g. weekly diary, quarterly recall).
• Durables
Durable items, which are not purchased frequently are included whenever avail-
able, but their inclusion is more probable in surveys which have recall modules.
• Self-production
Self production is included as a “place of purchase” for all countries but Chile
where it was not available. In some countries, it was pre-coded as an option for
the place of purchase, while in other cases we added it as a place of purchase
based on other variables, such as “mode of acquisition,” which had “purchased or
“self/home production.” Self-production values are typically asked as value if you
had purchased(or sold) this item at a market place.
• Product codes
All surveys have product codes for each consumption item, which typically follow
the United Nations Classification of Individual Consumption According to Pur-
pose (COICOP) or which we could matheced to the COICOP with a cross-walk.
For a few countries the COICOP classification was not available and we could not
find a product crosswalk. We used the nationally-specific product classification
scheme for these countries (Brazil, Chad, Peru and Tunisia).
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B.2 Categories of Places of Purchase
Our core sample of 31 surveys has by construction a place of purchase for each house-
hold purchase. Evidently, the names of places of purchases (PoP) available to respon-
dents differ across countries. However, the places of purchases can be classified into
broad categories which are approximately equivalent across countries. We detail below
the taxonomy used in this paper, which separates the consumption of goods into five
broad categories of places of purchase, and services into four broad categories.
• Goods
(1) Non-market consumption (e.g. Self-production)
(2) Market consumption, no store front (e.g. markets, street stalls)
(3) Market consumption, corner and convenience shops
(4) Market consumption, specialized shops (e.g. brand stores, bakeries)
(5) Market consumption, large stores (e.g. supermarkets, malls)
• Services
(6) Services provided by institutions (e.g. bank, hospital, university)
(7) Service provided by individuals (e.g. maid services, gardening)
(8) Entertainment (e.g. restaurants, hotels)
(9) Informal Entertainment (e.g. food truck)
• Unspecified
(99) N.A/other (e.g. other, not applicable, unspecified)
The majority of countries have places of purchase for each of the five good categories.
In some countries one of these categories is missing, all such cases are reported in the last
column of table B3. Four countries in particular do not distinguish between specialized
stores (category 4) and corner/convenience stores (category 3). For these countries we
imputed at the decile level the relative shares of categories 3 and 4, based on countries
with income up to 50% smaller or larger.
For services, it is more frequent that some of categories are missing. In particular
some countries do not have a detailed list of institutions as potential places of purchases
for services. These are typically also countries in which the share of expenditures with
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Figure B1: Average Share of Unspecified Category by COICOP
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an ’unspecified’ place of purchase is relatively large. Indeed when looking at what types
of products compose the unspecified category, over half are utilities, while the remaining
is principally education and health spending.
Finally, we assign the remaining places of purchase that are harder to categorize
(as purchases over the internet or from abroad) to category (6) “services provided by
institutions”. While this might not be accurate, we note that these PoP typically represent
a very small share of total expenditure.
The countries-specific assignment of places of purchase to the broad categories pre-
sented above is detailed in Table B4, for each PoP representing more than 0.5% of total
purchases. The table also reports the share of expenditures purchased from each cate-
gory, including the unspecified category.
Finally, we note that, to the best of our knowledge, the only other project which con-
structs a common taxonomy of places of purchases across countries is the International
Price Comparison (ICP) project, which builds purchasing power parity indexes. The
ICP provides a store type classifier for marketed consumption which is used by individ-
ual countries to obtain price quotes from a variety of retailer types. Our classification
mirrors that of the ICP.
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B.3 Global Consumption Database
A limitation of our core sample of 31 countries is that it tends to be geographically
clustered and in particular does not contain countries in Asia. To obtain an idea on
whether our results might be relevant for all low and middle income countries, we com-
pare food expenditure with that of the Global Consumption Database (GCD). The GCD
is the most comprehensive data source on consumer spending patterns in developing
countries to date, by assembling all available representative household expenditure sur-
veys across countries. In particular, it includes most countries in Asia. The dataset
is curated by the World Bank: aggregatef consumption statistics and further details
on sources and methodology are available at http://datatopics.worldbank.org/
consumption/.
We obtained access to the Global Consumption Database microdata, in order to com-
pare food expenditure in our core sample of 31 countries to the 79 low and middle
income countries available in the GCD. From our sample of 31 countries, 21 countries
overlap with the GCD and usually have the exact same survey as an original source.
With this enhanced dataset, which represents 51% of the world population,56 we mea-
sure food consumption as a share of total consumption and the slope of the food Engel
curve. First we note that for the 21 overlapping countries we find Engel curve slopes
within 5% of the GDC estimate. Second we compare food expenditure patterns in our
core sample 31 countries to the 58 countries which only appears in the GCD. We find
remarkably similar food expenditure shares and food Engel curve slopes, as a function
of development, which supports that our core sample informality measures could be in-
formative to the entire population located in developing countries, with the caveat that
informality patterns might still differ geographically.
56We exclude rich countries by design, but a few populous countries such as China, Egypt and Iran are
not part of the GCD. This explains the lion’s share of the missing population in the GCD sample.
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Table B4: Country-Specific Places of Purchase
BENIN
Assigned % Original name Classification
Formal 1.9 autre lieu d’achat formel sur le territoir 5 large stores
0.7 achat dans un super marche´ 5 large stores
0.6 achat dans un magasin ou un atelier formel 4 specialized shops
2.8 achat au secteur public ou parapublic 6 institutions
Informal 28.3 achat au domicile du vendeur, dans une pet 3 corner shops
22.8 achat sur un marche´ public 2 no store front
26.1 achat chez un ambulant, ou poste fixe sur 2 no store front
7.0 autre lieu d’achat informel (inde´pendant) 1 non-market
0.6 cadeau recu 1 non-market
8.6 bien ou service autoproduit 1 non-market
Unspec. 0.0 other 99 n.a./other
BOLIVIA
Formal 0.9 supermercado 5 large stores
11.5 tienda especializada 4 specialized shops
1.2 institucio´n de salud 6 institutions
0.5 comunicacio´n 6 institutions
3.5 instituto educativo 6 institutions
1.5 hotel, bar, restaurante 8 entertainment
Informal 14.2 tienda de conveniencia 3 corner shops
2.0 vendedor ambulante 2 no store front
3.5 puesto/kiosco 2 no store front
3.9 feria 2 no store front
19.2 mercado 2 no store front
1.5 auto consumo 1 non-market
1.9 de un hogar / transferencia 1 non-market
5.4 cantina 9 informal entertainment
Unspec. 28.0 other 99 n.a./other
BRAZIL
Formal 11.5 supermarket 5 large stores
0.7 department store 5 large stores
22.1 specialized shop 4 specialized shops
6.5 vehicle 4 specialized shops
4.0 pharmacy 4 specialized shops
0.7 bank 6 institutions
0.6 internet 6 institutions
1.5 health institution 6 institutions
2.5 education institution 6 institutions
0.5 lottery 6 institutions
2.7 restaurant 8 entertainment
Informal 3.4 grocery store 3 corner shops
0.8 small shop 2 no store front
1.2 fair 2 no store front
1.4 small market 2 no store front
1.4 street seller 2 no store front
8.3 person 1 non-market
4.8 private service 7 service from individual
2.1 bar-cafe 9 informal entertainment
0.5 recreation events 9 informal entertainment
Unspec. 20.8 other 99 n.a./other
BURKINA FASO
Formal 0.6 magasin de gros a petits prix 5 large stores
0.7 grands magasin 5 large stores
0.5 quincallerie (petite taille) 4 specialized shops
1.3 atelier, service reparation 4 specialized shops
1.7 station service (lubrifiants) 4 specialized shops
1.0 pharmacie 4 specialized shops
1.0 clinique, laboratoire medical public 6 institutions
0.7 ecole, lycee, universite publics 6 institutions
1.2 ecole, lycees, universite privas 6 institutions
0.6 cabine telephone privee 6 institutions
2.0 telephone, eau, electricite 6 institutions
1.8 bar, cafe, restaurant, hotel 8 entertainment
Informal 14.3 boutique de quartier 3 corner shops
0.9 kiosque ou echoppe quartier 2 no store front
40.5 marche 2 no store front
1.0 marchant ambulants 2 no store front
10.1 bien ou service autoproduit 1 non-market
12.4 menage 1 non-market
0.5 cadeau recu en nature ou en espace 1 non-market
2.1 autres service prives 7 service from individual
1.4 service de transport prive 7 service from individual
Unspec. 0.3 other 99 n.a./other
BURUNDI
Formal 3.6 Autre lieu d’achat formel 5 large stores
0.8 Magasin, atelier formel (societe) tenu 4 specialized shops
2.0 Secteur public ou parapublic 6 institutions
Informal 26.8 Domicile du vendeur, petite boutique 3 corner shops
32.9 Marche public 2 no store front
3.9 Vendeur ambulant ou poste fixe sur voie 2 no store front
0.9 Cadeau Recu 1 non-market
14.3 Bien ou service autoproduit 1 non-market
13.9 Autre lieu d’achat informel 1 non-market
Unspec. 0.0 Other 99 n.a./other
CAMEROON
Assigned % Original name Classification
Formal 1.0 Supermarche/Grand magasin 5 large stores
3.8 Magasin specialistes 4 specialized shops
2.9 Presetation de services publics 6 institutions
7.5 Secteur transport 6 institutions
2.1 Cliniques 6 institutions
7.0 Hotels/bars/restaurants 8 entertainment
Informal 10.7 Epiceries/Boutiques/Echoppes 3 corner shops
0.8 Vendeurs specialises hors magasins 2 no store front
3.4 Kiosque de jeux et Call Box 2 no store front
3.4 Vente ambulante 2 no store front
26.4 Marches 2 no store front
14.8 Don, cadeau recu 1 non-market
1.9 Domicile de vendeur 1 non-market
3.6 Auto production 1 non-market
0.9 Dans la nature/forit/brousse 1 non-market
2.5 Prestation de services individuels 7 service from individual
Unspec. 7.3 Other 99 n.a./other
CHAD
Formal 0.7 Supermarche 5 large stores
5.7 Boutique 4 specialized shops
1.1 Magasins 4 specialized shops
0.6 Prestataire service sante´ public 6 institutions
4.1 Autre prestataire de service prive´ 6 institutions
0.7 Enseignement prive´ 6 institutions
0.7 Transport prive´ 6 institutions
0.6 Enseignement public 6 institutions
0.9 Autre prestataire de service public 6 institutions
0.6 Prestataire service sante´ prive´ 6 institutions
1.6 Hoˆtel, Restaurant, .. 8 entertainment
Informal 0.5 Echoppe 3 corner shops
2.6 Marchand ambulant 2 no store front
25.8 Marche´ de quartier ou spe´cialise´ 2 no store front
30.1 Marche´ centraux 2 no store front
1.2 Tablier 2 no store front
17.3 Self-Consumption 1 non-market
Unspec. 4.9 Other 99 n.a./other
CHILE
Formal 26.5 supermercados 5 large stores
4.3 distribuidoras - mayoristas 5 large stores
1.6 ferreterI´as y multiferreterI´as 4 specialized shops
0.5 tienda especializada 4 specialized shops
4.9 farmacias 4 specialized shops
2.0 internet 6 institutions
0.5 extranjero 6 institutions
2.4 hospital pU´blico y consultorios 6 institutions
5.4 clI´nicas 6 institutions
1.0 restaurantes y bares 8 entertainment
Informal 13.3 almacE´n tradicional 3 corner shops
3.3 ferias libres 2 no store front
2.9 comercio ambulante 2 no store front
0.9 vegas - mercados 2 no store front
Unspec. 30.5 other 99 n.a./other
COLOMBIA
Formal 4.7 Supermercados de barrio 5 large stores
10.1 Almacenes o supermercados de cadena y tien 5 large stores
2.1 Plazas de mercado y galerı´as 5 large stores
0.6 Hipermercados 5 large stores
11.1 Establecimientos especializados en la vent 4 specialized shops
1.7 Farmacias y droguerı´as 10 pharmacies
1.0 Televentas y ventas por cata´logo 6 institutions
5.1 Restaurantes 8 entertainment
Informal 0.9 Graneros 3 corner shops
13.5 Tiendas de barrio 3 corner shops
1.7 Vendedores ambulantes o ventas callejeras 2 no store front
1.1 Persona particular 1 non-market
0.9 Transfers, from household 1 non-market
10.3 Self production 1 non-market
1.0 Cafeterı´as y establecimientos de comidas 9 informal entertainment
Unspec. 32.9 Other 99 n.a./other
COMOROS
Formal 2.0 Achat dans un super marche´ 5 large stores
16.9 Autre lieu d’achat formel 5 large stores
4.9 Achat dans un magasin ou un atelier formel 4 specialized shops
8.3 Achat dans un magasin ou un atelier formel 4 specialized shops
6.1 Achat hors lieu de re´sidence ou a` l’e´tr 6 institutions
8.6 Achat au secteur public ou parapublic 6 institutions
Informal 19.1 Achat au domicile du vendeur, dans une pet 3 corner shops
CONGO DRC
12.6 Achat sur un marche´ public 2 no store front
5.5 Achat chez un ambulant, ou poste fixe sur 2 no store front
4.2 Bien ou service autoproduit 1 non-market
2.3 Cadeau rec¸u 1 non-market
8.3 Autre lieu d’achat informel (inde´pendant) 1 non-market
Formal 0.5 Achat supermarche 5 large stores
3.2 Achat magasin indo-pakistanais 4 specialized shops
3.1 Achat secteur public 6 institutions
Informal 3.8 Achat magasin non indo-pakistanais 3 corner shops
36.5 Achat marche public 2 no store front
10.1 Achat Ambulant 2 no store front
17.5 Bien ou service autoproduit 1 non-market
5.8 Autre lieu informel 1 non-market
17.9 Achat domicile 1 non-market
1.4 Cadeau recu 1 non-market
Unspec. 0.1 Other 99 n.a./other
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COSTA RICA
Assigned % Original name Classification
Formal 1.2 tienda por departamentos 5 large stores
17.1 supermercado 5 large stores
11.3 local especializado 4 specialized shops
4.3 gasolinera y estacio´n de servicio 4 specialized shops
1.1 carnicerı´a / pescaderı´a 4 specialized shops
1.0 salones de este´tica o belleza 4 specialized shops
3.4 almace´n de electrodome´sticos y de tecnol 4 specialized shops
3.4 tienda de ropa / zapaterı´a / perfumerı´a 4 specialized shops
1.9 laboratorio / clı´nica / centro me´dico 6 institutions
1.1 en el exterior 6 institutions
3.9 restaurante / soda / cafeterı´a / helader 8 entertainment
1.7 comedor en lugar de trabajo 8 entertainment
Informal 6.2 pulperı´a o minisuper 3 corner shops
2.4 vendedor ambulante o a domicilio 2 no store front
0.5 feria del agricultor 2 no store front
0.8 local de artı´culos usados 2 no store front
9.1 recibido o comprado a otros hogares 1 non-market
0.8 retiro del negocio 1 non-market
Unspec. 25.1 other 99 n.a./other
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Formal 3.8 tienda por departamentos 5 large stores
3.6 supermercados 5 large stores
0.7 tienda de respuestos de vehiculos 4 specialized shops
1.1 taller de mecanica en general, desabulladu 4 specialized shops
0.6 puesto de rifa de aguante y loteria electr 4 specialized shops
1.2 tienda de ropa 4 specialized shops
1.0 ferreterias 4 specialized shops
0.8 carniceria 4 specialized shops
1.2 tienda de electrodomesticos 4 specialized shops
0.5 peluqueria 4 specialized shops
1.4 salon de belleza 4 specialized shops
2.3 farmacias 4 specialized shops
1.2 compan˜ia de tele´fonos 6 institutions
1.9 envasadora de gas 6 institutions
1.8 comedor popular 6 institutions
2.4 clinica 6 institutions
1.3 hospitales 6 institutions
1.7 corporacio´n de electricidad 6 institutions
3.5 estacio´n de gasolina 6 institutions
1.5 colegio 6 institutions
0.5 restaurante 8 entertainment
Informal 20.3 colmado 3 corner shops
0.7 almacen de provisiones 3 corner shops
0.6 picapollo 2 no store front
0.5 puesto de pollo 2 no store front
3.2 vendedora ambulante 2 no store front
1.2 mercados 2 no store front
0.9 puestos de venta 2 no store front
1.9 autoproduction 1 non-market
1.6 cafeteria 9 informal entertainment
Unspec. 29.5 other 99 n.a./other
ECUADOR
Formal 4.0 supermercados de cadena 5 large stores
1.2 hipermercados 5 large stores
0.5 repuestos de automotores 4 specialized shops
0.5 tercena/carnicera 4 specialized shops
1.3 librerias y papelerias 4 specialized shops
1.4 otros sitios de compra especializados 4 specialized shops
1.0 salas de belleza 4 specialized shops
0.5 computadoras y accesorios 4 specialized shops
1.1 gasolineras 4 specialized shops
2.1 electrodomesticos y accesorios 4 specialized shops
4.1 ropa de todo tipo 4 specialized shops
1.9 calzado de todo tipo 4 specialized shops
1.2 panaderas 4 specialized shops
1.2 mecanicas automotrices 4 specialized shops
0.8 muebles y enceres 4 specialized shops
5.1 boticas y farmacias 4 specialized shops
2.2 establecimientos privados de salud 6 institutions
4.7 establecimientos educativos 6 institutions
0.5 instituciones publicas 6 institutions
2.2 transporte de pasajeros 6 institutions
1.2 venta por cat·logo o television 6 institutions
0.6 aseguradoras 6 institutions
1.4 servicios profesionales (abogados, arqu) 6 institutions
2.3 restaurantes, salones 8 entertainment
Informal 12.8 tiendas de barrio 3 corner shops
1.5 bodegas, distribuidores 3 corner shops
10.4 mercados 2 no store front
1.1 ferias libres 2 no store front
2.0 vendedores ambulantes 2 no store front
11.1 productos autoconsumo, autosuministro 1 non-market
0.9 personas particulares 7 service from individual
Unspec. 12.9 other 99 n.a./other
ESWATINI
Assigned % Original name Classification
Formal 27.5 supermarket 5 large stores
1.4 butchery 4 specialized shops
1.7 hardware store 4 specialized shops
5.6 clothes/footwear/linen 4 specialized shops
Informal 5.8 grocery 3 corner shops
0.5 spaza 3 corner shops
4.0 street vendor 2 no store front
1.9 market 2 no store front
11.2 gifts/transfers 1 non-market
6.9 self production 1 non-market
Unspec. 33.4 other 99 n.a./other
MEXICO
Formal 2.1 tiendas departamentales 5 large stores
1.0 tiendas con membresia 5 large stores
11.4 supermercados 5 large stores
21.1 tiendas especificas del ramo 4 specialized shops
0.5 compras fuera del pais 6 institutions
0.7 diconsa 6 institutions
2.4 restaurantes 8 entertainment
Informal 12.8 tiendas de abarrotes 3 corner shops
0.6 tiendas de conveniencia 3 corner shops
5.6 persona particular 2 no store front
3.1 vendedores ambulantes 2 no store front
2.0 tianguis o mercado sobre ruedas 2 no store front
3.7 mercado 2 no store front
1.3 auto produccio´n 1 non-market
2.6 loncherias, fondas, torterias , cocina 9 informal entertainment
Unspec. 28.8 other 99 n.a./other
MONTENEGRO
Formal 17.2 supermarket 5 large stores
36.2 store 4 specialized shops
Informal 5.3 stall 2 no store front
5.3 own production 1 non-market
Unspec. 35.8 other 99 n.a./other
MOROCCO
Formal 0.7 Gas stations (benzine) 4 specialized shops
0.5 Small Bookshop, kiosk 4 specialized shops
0.8 Modern clothing shop 4 specialized shops
3.1 Butcher or retail chicken seller 4 specialized shops
1.2 Craftsman’s shop (hairdresser, tailor) 4 specialized shops
1.8 Pharmacy 10 pharmacies
35.5 Public and semi-public agencies 6 institutions
1.5 Regular transportation means (bus, train, 6 institutions
1.7 Public administration 6 institutions
0.7 Public baths, shower, swimming pool 6 institutions
4.1 Private education institution 6 institutions
1.3 Medical care in private institution 6 institutions
Informal 1.9 Grocer’s 3 corner shops
9.7 Neighborhood or village grocer 3 corner shops
2.6 Neighborhood market 2 no store front
1.3 Itinerant merchant selling on sidewalks 2 no store front
10.7 Weekly market 2 no store front
0.5 City market or central market 2 no store front
3.6 Self production/consumption 1 non-market
0.7 Cafe, non-standing restaurant 9 informal entertainment
Unspec. 11.2 Other 99 n.a./other
MOZAMBIQUE
Formal 8.8 loja 4 specialized shops
Informal 18.6 mercado informal 2 no store front
12.2 mercado 2 no store front
31.5 auto produc¸a˜o 1 non-market
Unspec. 28.5 Other 99 n.a./other
NIGER
Formal 2.6 Clinique, laboratoire, ecole 6 institutions
6.7 Prestation services publiques 6 institutions
6.4 Secteur transport 6 institutions
1.5 Hotel, bar restaurant 8 entertainment
Informal 27.1 Epicerie, boutique 3 corner shops
13.0 Marche 2 no store front
2.9 Vente ambulante 2 no store front
1.6 Cadeau recu 1 non-market
15.2 Auto production 1 non-market
4.7 Prestation service individuels 7 service from individual
Unspec. 18.1 Other 99 n.a./other
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PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Assigned % Original name Classification
Formal 34.5 Supermarket 5 large stores
Informal 9.4 Small shop, canteen, tuck shop 3 corner shops
10.5 Local market 2 no store front
3.8 Street vendor 2 no store front
14.2 Home production 1 non-market
10.2 Gift 1 non-market
Unspec. 17.6 Other 99 n.a./other
PERU
Formal 3.4 Supermercado 5 large stores
1.1 Bodega (por mayor) 5 large stores
0.8 Panaderı´a 4 specialized shops
0.6 Peluquerı´a 4 specialized shops
0.9 Librerı´a 4 specialized shops
0.5 Tienda especializada al por mayor 4 specialized shops
5.8 Tienda especializada al por menor 4 specialized shops
3.6 Farmacia 10 pharmacies
3.4 Empresas de Transporte formales 6 institutions
1.6 Centro de estudios 6 institutions
1.3 Grifos de empresas 6 institutions
0.5 Talleres formales 6 institutions
0.6 Clı´nica particular 6 institutions
1.0 Restaurantes y/o´ bares 8 entertainment
Informal 14.6 Bodega (por menor) 3 corner shops
24.0 Mercado (por menor) 2 no store front
2.7 Feria 2 no store front
3.3 Mercado (por mayor) 2 no store front
5.0 Ambulante 2 no store front
0.5 Empresas de Transporte informales 7 service from individual
Unspec. 22.3 Other 99 n.a./other
CONGO REPUBLIC
Formal 1.0 Grands magasins 5 large stores
7.0 Autres commerces modernes 4 specialized shops
3.9 Secteur transports 6 institutions
2.5 Cliniques, laboratoires me´dicaux et e´col 6 institutions
5.8 Prestataires de services publics 6 institutions
3.9 Hotels, restaurants, bars, cafes 8 entertainment
Informal 3.4 Epiceries modernes 3 corner shops
8.4 Echoppes sur marches et sur bord de route 2 no store front
6.2 Marchands ambulants 2 no store front
42.8 Marches 2 no store front
3.9 Me´nages 1 non-market
4.5 Produit autoconsommes 1 non-market
0.5 Cadeau recu 1 non-market
5.5 Prestataires de services individuels 7 service from individual
Unspec. 0.0 Other 99 n.a./other
RWANDA
Formal 0.6 Supermarket/big shop 5 large stores
4.6 Specialized shop 4 specialized shops
2.4 Bar/restaurant 8 entertainment
Informal 13.5 Small shop/boutique 3 corner shops
1.7 Individual 2 no store front
0.8 Mobile seller 2 no store front
12.5 Market 2 no store front
11.5 Self production 1 non-market
26.5 From a household 1 non-market
13.1 Service provider 7 service from individual
Unspec. 12.7 Other 99 n.a./other
SAO TOME
Formal 5.2 Lojas modernas 5 large stores
5.4 Grandes Lojas 5 large stores
1.3 Outros comercios modernos 4 specialized shops
0.5 Clinicas laboratorios medicos Hospitais 6 institutions
0.8 Sector de transportes 6 institutions
4.3 Prestates de servicios publicos 6 institutions
0.9 Hotels, restaurantes, bares, cafes 8 entertainment
Informal 33.9 Quiosque / Quitanda 3 corner shops
24.0 Mercado 2 no store front
7.8 Vendedor Ambulante 2 no store front
0.5 Prendas Recebidas 1 non-market
0.9 Campo, mato 1 non-market
1.9 Auto Consumo 1 non-market
0.6 Autoabastecimento 1 non-market
3.7 Prestates de servicios individuais 7 service from individual
1.6 Candongueiro 7 service from individual
Unspec. 6.4 Other 99 n.a./other
SENEGAL
Assigned % Original name Classification
Formal 2.0 Station service (carburants, lubrifiants,e 4 specialized shops
1.8 Boulangerie, paˆtisserie 4 specialized shops
1.2 Service de transport public 6 institutions
11.6 Bar, cafe´, restaurant, hoˆtel 8 entertainment
Informal 40.3 Boutique de quartier 3 corner shops
0.6 Marchand Ambulant 2 no store front
10.8 Kiosque ou e´choppe au quartier 2 no store front
16.3 Marche´s 2 no store front
3.5 Cadeau rec¸u en nature 1 non-market
1.6 Bien ou service autoproduit 1 non-market
1.2 Autres services prive´s 7 service from individual
5.1 Service de transport prive´ 7 service from individual
Unspec. 1.4 Other 99 n.a./other
SERBIE
Formal 8.9 Hypermarket 5 large stores
23.8 Specialized shop 4 specialized shops
2.9 Discounted shop 4 specialized shops
Informal 29.6 Minimarket 3 corner shops
4.8 Market/open 2 no store front
1.8 Gray economy 2 no store front
5.3 Own production/Own business 1 non-market
2.2 Gifts/received transfers 1 non-market
Unspec. 20.7 Other 99 n.a./other
SOUTH AFRICA
Formal 38.6 Chain store 5 large stores
11.2 Other retailer 4 specialized shops
Informal 0.9 Street trading 2 no store front
2.7 Other 2 no store front
0.6 From a household 1 non-market
Unspec. 45.7 Other 99 n.a./other
TANZANIA
Formal 0.5 Duka kubwa(Department stores) 5 large stores
37.3 Shop 4 specialized shops
Informal 2.4 Street vendor 2 no store front
22.8 Market 2 no store front
4.7 Other household 1 non-market
0.5 Gift from other household 1 non-market
16.0 Produced by household 1 non-market
1.8 Gift or free 1 non-market
Unspec. 13.7 Other 99 n.a./other
TUNISIA
Formal 1.3 Hyper, supermarche 5 large stores
67.8 Boutique privee 4 specialized shops
Informal 1.2 Point de vente marche 2 no store front
4.5 Ambulant 2 no store front
1.6 Cadeau 1 non-market
1.3 Auto production 1 non-market
Unspec. 22.2 Other 99 n.a./other
URUGUAY
Formal 11.7 autoservicio, cadena de supermercados 5 large stores
1.0 shopping o galeria 5 large stores
0.5 barraca, ferreteria, vidrieria 4 specialized shops
1.3 casa de electrodomesticos, telefonos 4 specialized shops
0.7 verduleria, puesto, fruteria 4 specialized shops
0.9 zapateria, marroquineria, talabarteria 4 specialized shops
2.3 merceria, tienda 4 specialized shops
1.5 panaderia, confiteria 4 specialized shops
2.6 carniceria, polleria, pescaderia 4 specialized shops
0.7 farmacia, perfumeria, panalera 4 specialized shops
0.8 fuera del pais 6 institutions
0.5 cantina, trabajo, colegio 8 entertainment
0.9 restaurante, parrillada 8 entertainment
Informal 7.8 almacen 3 corner shops
0.1 almacen de ramos generales 3 corner shops
1.0 vendedor ambulante, puesto callejero, carr 2 no store front
0.7 quiosco, salon 2 no store front
1.5 feria vecinal 2 no store front
0.5 distribuidor o repartidor a domicilio 1 non-market
0.8 bar, pizzeria 9 informal entertainment
Unspec. 59.6 other 99 n.a./other
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C Theory Appendix
C.1 Proof of expression (4)
Under our assumption that pj1 ⇡ pj0, 8j we can write the uncompensated elasticity of
product j as a function of the uncompensated elasticities of varieties j1 and j0 and the
cross-variety price elasticities in the following way:
ej = ej1(1  aj) + ej0aj + ej1,0(1  aj) + ej0,1aj (10)
where aj =
p0x0
px is the share of informal consumption in total consumption of the
product and ej0,1 it the elasticity of demand for the informal variety with respect to the
price of the formal variety.
Writing eCj the compensated price elasticity of product j the Slutsky equation is ej =
eCj   hjsj. Using this and the equalities hj = hj1(1  aj) + hj0aj and sj = sj1 + sj0 we
obtain:
eCj = e
C
j1(1  aj) + eCj0aj + eCj1,0(1  aj) + eCj0,1aj (11)
Slutsky symmetry implies eCj1,0(1   aj) = eCj0,1aj. Using our assumptions of equal
compensated cross-variety elasticity across products (eCj0,1 = e˜
C, 8j) , equal compensated
own-price elasticity across varieties within products ( eCj1 = e
C
j0, 8j) and equal compen-
sated own-price elasticities across products (eCj = e
C, 8j), and re-arranging, we obtain:
eCj1 = e
C   2e˜Caj (12)
To obtain an expression for the compensated price elasticity ej1, the parameter of
interest, we use the Slutsky equation again and obtain:
ej1 = e
C   2e˜Caj   hj1sj1 (13)
C.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In what follows we assume that all product and variety Engel curves are linear with
respect to log household income. Taking a first-order Taylor approximations around
yi = y¯ and assuming sij(y¯) = sj we can write s
i
j = sj + b j(f
i   1) where b j is the slope of
the EC for product j. We can then write the tax rate on a product j when all varieties are
taxed as:
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t⇤j =
R
i(g¯  gi)fi(1+ b j f
i 1
sj
)
 gej (14)
The change in the optimal rate over the development path, holding efficiency consid-
erations constant (∂ej = 0), can therefore be written as:
∂t⇤j =
b j
sj
(
∂b j
b j
  ∂sj
sj
)
R
i(g¯  gi)fi(fi   1)
 gej (15)
where
R
i(g¯ gi)fi(fi 1) gej > 0.
Similarly we can write the tax rate on a product j when only formal varieties are
taxed as:
t⇤⇤j =
R
i(g¯  gi)fi(1+ b j1 f
i 1
sj1
)
 gej1 (16)
and
∂t⇤⇤j =
b j1
sj1
(
∂b j1
b j1
  ∂sj1
sj1
)
R
i(g¯  gi)fi(fi   1)
 gej1 (17)
The first part of proposition 1 states that the redistribution gain from taxing all formal
varieties uniformly is decreasing over the development path, ie that equity considera-
tions push the optimal uniform rate t⇤1 downwards with development. Applying the
above to the case of t⇤1 , we find that that, holding efficiency considerations constant,
∂t⇤1 < 0 if the following condition holds:
∂b1
b1
<
∂s1
s1
(18)
The negative slope of the Informality Engel Curves implies b1 > 0. Equity considerations
therefore push the optimal uniform rate down over the development path as long as the
formal aggregate budget share s1 increases faster than the slope of the Engel curve for
all varieties b1, which is minus the slope of the Informality Engel Curve depicted in the
paper. This proves the first part of the proposition.
To prove the second part of the proposition, which relates to how the efficiency cost
of taxing all formal varieties changes over the development path, start from expression
(4) in the paper for a ‘product’ consisting of all formal varieties. Writing h1 this product’s
income effect, s1 it’s budget share, a the share of all formal varieties in total consumption,
we obtain:
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e1 = e
C   2e˜Ca  h1s1 = eC   2e˜Ca  h1(1  a) (19)
where the last expression is obtained by using s1 = (1  a). The change in e1 over
the development path, under our assumptions, can therefore be written as:
∂e1 = ∂a( 2e˜C + h1) (20)
As shown in the paper the size of the informal sector falls with development, so
∂a < 0. The term is therefore positive as long as e˜C > h12 . When this condition is met
the price elasticity of demand for formal varieties increases over the development path,
so the efficiency cost of taxing these varieties falls.
C.3 Proof of proposition 2
We start by proving the first part of the proposition, which states under which conditions
the redistribution gain from taxing food less than non-food products increases over the
development path when all varieties can be taxed. This implies that, absent efficiency
considerations, the optimal rate on food t⇤F falls over development relative to the optimal
rate on non-food t⇤N. Using expression (15) above we obtain the following condition for
∂t⇤N > ∂t⇤F :
bN
sN
(
∂bN
bN
  ∂sN
sN
) >
bF
sF
(
∂bF
bF
  ∂sF
sF
) (21)
Re-arranging and using the fact that bN =  bF and sF = 1  sN when all varieties
can be taxed, we obtain
∂bN
bN
>
∂sN
sN
1  2sN
sN(1  sN) (22)
Where, as shown in the paper, we have ∂sN > 0 and bN > 0. There are two cases
of interest, depending on which of sN or sF is highest. When households spend on
aggregate more on non-food than on food products (sN > 0.5), as is the case in most
countries in our sample, the right-hand-side of the expression is negative, so that the
condition holds as long as bN (minus the slope of the food Engel curve) does not fall
too much over the development path. This is the case described in the first part of
proposition 2 in the text. Note however that if sN < 0.5 the condition can still hold as
long as ∂bN is positive and sN does not increase too much relative to bN. This case is less
empirically relevant, but note that it can be explained using the intuition developed in
the paper. All else equal (in particular, holding the slope of Engel curves constant), the
redistribution potential of taxing food and non-food at different rates is minimized when
84
food and non-food are consumed in same proportions in the aggregate. An increase in
the slope of the non-food Engel curve (or, equivalently, a steepening of the food Engel
curve), all else equal, increases this redistribution potential. The redistribution potential
will thus fall in a context in which sN starts below 0.5 and increases, unless the slope of
the Engel curve increases enough to compensate for the increase in sN.
The change in the efficiency cost of taxing food less than non-food products over
the development path, discussed in the second part of proposition 2, is governed by
the relative values of ∂eN and ∂eF. The uncompensated price elasticity of demand for
product j is given by:
ej = e
C   hjsj (23)
Under our assumptions the change in this elasticity can be written as:
∂ej =  hj∂sj (24)
As shown in the paper over the development path ∂sN =  ∂sF > 0, which implies
∂eN < ∂eF. The efficiency cost of taxing non-food products therefore increases relative
to that of taxing food products: efficiency considerations push the optimal rate on food
up relative to that non non-food products over the development path.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove the first part of proposition 3, we use expression (17) above to write the change
in optimal rates on food and non food when only formal varieties can be taxed, ∂t⇤⇤N and
∂t⇤⇤F . The condition for ∂t⇤⇤N > ∂t⇤⇤F can be written as:
b1N
s1N
(
∂b1N
b1N
  ∂s1N
s1N
) >
b1F
s1F
(
∂b1F
b1F
  ∂s1F
s1F
) (25)
Re-arranging, we obtain:
∂b1N
s1N
  ∂b1F
s1F
+
∂s1F
s1F
b1F
s1F
  ∂s1N
s1N
b1N
s1N
> 0 (26)
This expression will hold as long as the non-food formal Engel curve slope increases
more (or decreases less) than the food formal Engel curve slope ( ∂b1Ns1N >
∂b1F
s1F
) and the
non-food formal budget share doesn’t increase too fast relative to the food formal budget
share.
The second part of the proposition states under what conditions the efficiency cost
of taxing non-food products increases relative to that of taxing food products in a world
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in which only formal varieties can be taxed, ie ∂eF1 > ∂eN1. Under our assumptions the
change in the price elasticity of the formal variety of product j over the development
path is given by:
∂ej1 =  2e˜C∂aj   ∂sj1 (27)
The condition ∂eF1 > ∂eN1 is satisfied when:
2e˜C(∂aF   ∂aN) < ∂sN1   ∂sF1 (28)
This condition holds as long as, over the development path, the informal share of food
consumption falls faster than that of non-food consumption (∂aF < ∂aN) and the aggre-
gate budget share of formal food varieties does not increase too fast relative to that of
non-food varieties.
C.5 Supply-side assumptions
This subsection shows that our assumptions regarding the pass-through of taxes to prices
in the formal and informal sector can be modelled as a equilibrium responses of firms
with a simple supply-side model.
Each variety j1 is produced by a firm that pays taxes (a formal firm), and each variety
j0 by a firm that does not pay taxes (an informal firm). All firms produce using only
labor L with the following production function xjl = fjl Ljl, 8l = 0, 1, labor is paid a fixed
wage w. Firms maximize their profit pjl = qjlxjl  wxjl/fjl where qjl are the endogenous
producer prices, which then determine consumer prices pj1 = qj1(1+ tj) if the firm is
formal, pj0 = qj0 if the firm is informal.
We assume firms compete under monopolistic competition, which implies that firms
maximize profit pjl whilst taking into account the demand function xjl(pjl) they face.
Writing ejl the price elasticity of demand for variety jl and taking the first-order-condition
with respect to qjl we obtain:
qjl =
ejl
ejl   1
w
fjl
(29)
This implies the following expression for consumer prices:
pj1 = (1+ tj)
ej1
ej1   1
w
fj1
(30)
and
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pj1 =
ej0
ej0   1
w
fj0
(31)
This in turn implies a pass-through of one to prices in the formal sector, zero to prices
in the informal sector.
C.6 Supply-chain considerations
To consider how our pass-through assumptions are affected by allowing informal retail-
ers to buy from formal suppliers, consider an extension to the above model in which
downstream firms produce varieties jl using inputs produced by upstream firms k. Up-
stream firms produce using only labor xk = Lk. Downstream firms’ production function
is given by:
xjl =
⇣
Â
k
ajlkx
r 1
r
jlk
⌘ r
r 1 (32)
where xjlk is the quantity of inputs k used by the downstream firm producing variety
jl, and r the constant elasticity of substitution in production.
The consumer price of variety jl can now be written as:
pjl = (1+ tj f jl)
Pjl
fjl
ejl
ejl   1 (33)
where f jl = 1 if the firm producing jl is formal, zero otherwise, and Pjl is its input
cost index. Pjl is obtained by cost minimization and equal to:
Pjl =
⇣
Â
k
a
r
jlk p
1 r
jlk
⌘1/(1 r)
(34)
Here pjlk is equal to the net of tax price paid for the product k by the firm producing
variety jl. We assume the consumption tax is a Value-Added-Tax, so that if both firms k
and jl are informal no tax is paid, if firm k is informal no tax is paid, and only if firm k is
formal and firm jl informal the tax is paid on the transaction between them. Formally:
pjlk = (1+ tk fk(1  f jl))w rr  1 (35)
Combining expressions (33), (34) and (35), we can write the pass-through of taxes to
the price of formal and informal downstream firms. The pass-through of taxes to the
87
price of formal downstream firms ( f jl = 1) is still equal to 1:
∂pj1
∂tj
1+ tj
pj1
= 1 (36)
The pass-through of taxes to the price of informal downstream firms ( f jl = 0) can be
written as:
∂pj0
∂tj
1+ tj
pj0
= sj0F (37)
where sj0F is the share of formal inputs in firm j0’s total production costs:
sj0F =Â
k
fka
r
j0kP
r 1
j0 p
1 r
j0k (38)
D Calibration Appendix
This sub-section explains how we calibrate tax rates under the three optimal policy sce-
narios defined in expressions (6), (8) and (9). Table 4 summarizes our choice of calibra-
tion parameters.
First, we calibrate several parameters directly from our data: we use the observed
budget shares described in Section 3, total household expenditure to proxy for house-
hold income and the the observed informal shares of consumption for each good and
country. We relax our theoretical assumptions that Engel curves are log-linear and that
economic development does not affect within-country inequality, using instead the ob-
served budget shares and income distributions in each country. Note that our model
calls for using budget shares observed under a counterfactual ’no tax or transfers’ sce-
nario. We do not attempt to adjust observed budget shares to take into account the fact
that they are affected by current tax systems as this would require an in-depth under-
standing of the tax and transfer system in each country in our sample which is beyond
the scope of this paper.
We similarly use our data to obtain estimates of income elasticities for all goods and
varieties.To obtain an estimate of the income elasticity of demand for the formal variety,
hj1 we use our estimates of the slope of the formal Engel curve for good j, b j1, and the
expression hj1 = 1+
b j1
sj1
. We similarly obtain income elasticities hj using hj = 1+
b j
sj
.
Second, we use existing literature to calibrate the remaining parameters.There are
no estimates of the cross-price compensated elasticity of demand between formal and
informal varieties e˜Caj so we use estimates of the elasticity of substitution in consump-
tion across stores of different types available in the literature. The cross-price elasticity
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is related to this elasticity of substitution s in a CES utility function by the expression
eC0,1 = ss0 where s0 is the share of informal consumption of total consumption of the
good. Faber and Fally (2017) estimate an elasticity of substitution between large and
small stores in the US of 2.2, Atkin et al. (2018b) estimate the elasticity of substitution
between foreign and domestic supermarkets and find estimates in the 2-4 range. We
therefore use 3 as our baseline of s. For an average value of s0 of 0.5 this yields a base-
line value of e˜Caj of 1.5, we consider the range 1-2 as a robustness check. We set a value
of -0.7 for the own-price compensated elasticity of goods. Together, these parameters
yield values for the own-price uncompensated elasticity of goods (calibrated using ex-
pression (33) that are in the [ 2, 0.5] range, in line with estimates from the literature
(see for example Deaton et al., 1994).
Finally, we specify government preferences by setting the same social welfare weight
for households in a given decile of the household expenditure distribution in each coun-
try. Our specification implies that governments place ten times more weight on income
received by households in the poorest decile than in the richest decile. In all countries
the richest decile is assigned a weight gi equal to 1, the second richest decile a weight
equal to 2, the third a weight equal to 3, and so on, until the poorest decile, which is
assigned a weight equal to 10.
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